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Introduction
Religious faith ought ... to be a constant fount of humility .... It ought to
teach ... [men] that their religion is most certainly true if it recognizes the
element of error and sin, of finiteness and contingency which creeps into the
statement of even the sublimest truth. Historically, the highest form of dem-
ocratic toleration is based upon these very religious insights.1
Discrimination based upon religious beliefs and expressions forms the basis
for some of the most serious deprivations of civil and political rights. The
religious beliefs and expressions that are commonly the ground for discrimi-
nation include all of the traditional faiths and justifications from which
norms of responsible conduct - that is, judgments about right and wrong -
are derived.
2
The father of international law, Hugo Grotius, alleged that in the same
sense that religious toleration depends upon respect for international law,
a stable international order depends upon religious toleration. 3 Thirty
years of bitter warfare among princes claiming that theirs was the one true
dominion authorized by God persuaded Grotius that non-interference in
the religious affairs of the state was essential to ensure international stabil-
ity. The Treaty of Westphalia adopted this understanding in 1648,
enshrining it in the principle cuius regio, eius religio - whose the rule, his
the religion.4 Under the Treaty, external actors may not violate political
boundaries to interfere in the religious affairs of other states, but the state
1. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS 135-
36 (1944).
2. M.S. McDouGAL Er AL., HuMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC
POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAw OF HUMAN DIGNITY 653 (1980) (footnote omitted).
3. See id. at 668.
4. The Treaty of Westphalia brought an end to the Thirty Years' War. See id. at 668-
69. See also KENNETH C. RANDALL, FEDERAL. COURTS AND THE INrn ATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS PARADIGM 197 (1990) (explaining that the Peace of Westphalia "separated church
and state, but allowed each sovereign to oversee religious matters within its territory.").
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may suppress the religious practices of its own people. Roughly 350 years
later, this principle continues to govern international relations with the
consequence that religious liberty exists at the border between states at the
expense of religious minorities within them.
5
Religious minorities suffer the worst forms of human rights abuses. In
the mid-1990s, as many as 250,000 Muslims died at the hands of Ortho-
dox Christian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 6 and an estimated 164,000
Christians were slaughtered annually in primarily Islamic countries.7 In
1999, Serbs targeted Muslim Albanians in Kosovo. Currently, Sudan is
enslaving Christians and minority Muslims,8 while China and other com-
munist countries are forcing Tibetan Buddhists and Christians to undergo
"reeducation" through forced labor.9 Religious minorities in these coun-
tries and elsewhere in North Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia have
also endured the severest forms of torture, including electric shock, burn-
ing, flogging, amputations, suspension by wrists and ankles, and crucifix-
ion.10 Members of religious minorities also frequently face separation
from loved ones through compelled marriages to members of different
faiths, forced conversions and reeducation, and the systematic rape and
impregnation of women.
Part I of this Article investigates these and other crimes against
humanity that governments around the world perpetrate against religious
minorities. It explores case-studies in religiously-inspired genocide
directed against the Armenians, Bosnians, and Sudanese. Part I also exam-
ines two forms of religiously-inspired slavery - chattel slavery in the
Sudan, and forced or compulsory labor in communist countries." Finally,
5. See RANDALL, supra note 4, at 665-66, 669; see generally WLBUR K. JORDAN, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND (1940).
6. See infra part I.A.2.
7. See David Barrett & Todd Johnson, Annual Statistical Table on Global Mission:
1998, INT'L BULL. MISSIONARY RES. 27, 27 (Jan. 1998); David Barrett & Todd Johnson,
Annual Statistical Table on Global Mission: 1999, INT'L BULL. MISSIONARY RES. 24, 25 (Jan.
1999).
8. See infra part I.B.1.
9. See infra part I.B.2.
10. See infra part I.C.
11. This Article accepts the proposition shared by many influential thinkers that in
numerous important respects, Marxism is a form of religion. See, e.g., JosEPH A.
ScHUMPETER, CAPiTALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEmocRAcY 5 (1950). Schumpeter wrote that:
Marxism is a religion. To the believer it presents, first, a system of ultimate ends
that embody the meaning of life and are absolute standards by which to judge
events and actions; and, secondly, a guide to those ends which implies a plan of
salvation and the indication of the evil from which mankind, or a chosen section
of mankind, is to be saved.... Marxist socialism also belongs to that subgroup
which promises paradise on this side of the grave.
Id. See also KARL POPPER, 2 THE OPEN SocIETY AND ITS ENEMIEs 224 (1962) (affirming the
religious character of Marx's thought on the basis of its status as an "oracular philoso-
phy"); ROBERT TUCKER, PHILOSOPHY AND MYTH IN KARL MARx 22 (1961) (discussing four
parallels between Marxism and post-Augustinian Christianity including that they both
aspire to be a total account of the world, view all experience as historical, have as a main
theme of their story salvation or redemption, and contain the idea of the unity of theory
and practice).
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Part I examines religiously-inspired torture in many of the same countries.
Part II of this Article investigates international legal linkages between
human rights and religious liberty, and presents the results of the first
cross-national analysis of the relationship between general human rights
practices and state-religion relationships. The results indicate that the
extent of religious expression is the key variable associated with state
human rights practices. Other religious variables commonly associated
with human rights practices demonstrate only secondary linkages at best.
These variables include: (1) whether religion is established; (2) the man-
ner in which it is established, i.e., de jure or de facto; and (3) what kind of
religion is established. Accordingly, Part II suggests that by advancing reli-
gious liberty, the international community can advance other fundamental
human rights.
Part III of this Article explores additional grounds for reassessing the
treatment of religious minorities under international law. It contends that
policies promoting religious tolerance are essential for the following rea-
sons: (1) to respond to the dangerous multipolar, civilizational politics
now driving international relations; 12 (2) to moderate religious absolutism
and ensure normative development; and (3) to enable individuals to be
truly human. The first of these reasons to promote international religious
liberty is expressly "realist"13 and intended to provide a geo-political
rationale for advancing religious liberty. The second reason is primarily
utilitarian. It explores the importance of confrontation among religious
views for the purpose of refining and sometimes rejecting dogma, such as
the pro-slavery theology of the antebellum Christian South in America.
The final reason is essentially philosophical. It suggests that an essential
element of personhood is the ability to choose a fundamental orientation
toward the cosmos.
Part IV of this Article examines international law dealing with reli-
gious liberty. It evaluates United Nations and regional conventions in
Europe, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East protecting freedom of
thought and conscience, freedom to manifest belief in religion, and free-
dom from religious discrimination. Part IV concludes that none of these
instruments effectively protects even the most basic religious liberty, free-
dom of belief. Accordingly, Part V of this Article recommends another
approach to protecting religious minorities.
12. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAK-
ING OF WORLD ORDER (1996).
13. By "political realism," this Article refers to the writings on international relations
of authors such as Hans J. Morgenthau, Edward H. Carr, Henry Kissinger, and George
Kennan. See, e.g., HANs J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1978); E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRlsIS, 1919-1939: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2d ed. 1946); HENRY KIS.
SINGER, DIPLOMACY (1994); GEORGE F. KENNAN, REALITES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
(1966). Political realists generally agree that states should strive primarily to accumu-
late power, regardless of the ethical implications. See THEODORE A. COULOUMBIS &JAMES
H. WOLFE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 6-7 (3d ed. 1986).
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Part V contends that the first priority of an effective strategy for pro-
tecting religious minorities must be to enforce jus cogens under interna-
tional law. In addition, Part V recommends a new international convention
recognizing (1) the right to choose and change one's religion as a nondero-
gable liberty, and (2) other religious liberties, such as free expression, asso-
ciation, and education, subject to a compelling governmental interest test.
In this way, the international community can advance fundamental human
rights while preserving the principles of the Westphalian inter-state system
and even modernizing the Treaty to cope with the civilizational conflict of
the next century.
14
I. Violations of Jus Cogens Due to Religious Intolerance
Persecution of religious minorities characteristically involves the severest
forms of crimes against humanity, violations of so-called jus cogens under
international law. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, a jus cogens is "accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation
is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character."15 Likewise, jurists
characterizejus cogens variously as norms that are "mandatory and impera-
tive in any circumstances;" 16 "binding rules of international law" that
invalidate contrary treaties and rules of law;17 "principles of law generally
recognized by civilized nations;" 18 "super-constitutional" norms;19 princi-
ples that are "inalienable and subject to termination only in the ways in
which they are created;" 20 and principles of "natural law."
21
Jus cogens prohibit, at the very least, genocide, slavery, torture, piracy,
and war crimes. 22 Every sovereign state has jurisdiction to penalize viola-
14. The "Westphalian inter-state system" refers to the nation-state system which
began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The system envisions nation-states that are
sovereign over their territory, citizens, and natural resources, and that are equal by jurid-
ical fiat, rather than by virtue of some higher authority (such as the church). See RAN-
DAL, supra note 4, at 196-97 (noting that church and state are separated and each
sovereign is autonomously in charge of the religious matters within its territory).
15. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969; art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698-99.
16. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Law of Treaties, 11958] 2 Y.B.Irr'L L.CoM1'N 20, 26, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/115.
17. See generally JOHANN C. BLurrscHu, MODERN LAw OF NATIONS OF CrvLIZED
STATES (1867).
18. Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties, [1953] 2 Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N 90, 155, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/63.
19. South West Africa, 1966 I.CJ. 6, 298 (July 18) (Tanaka, J. dissenting) ("[Tihe
guarantee of fundamental human rights and freedoms possesses a super-constitutional
significance.").
20. McDouGAL Er AL., supra note 2, at 318.
21. CHRISTIAN WoFF, Jus GENTIUM METHODO ScialTmFicA PERTRACTATUM 10 (1. Drake
trans., 1934).
22. See McDOUGAL Er AL., supra note 2, at 349-50; RANDALL, supra note 4, at 163-64.
More recently, states have recognized that universal jurisdiction extends to hostage tak-
ing, crimes against internationally protected persons, hijacking, and sabotage of aircraft.
Cornell International Law Journal
tions of thesejus cogens.23 Moreover, no state may appeal to usually appli-
cable exceptions to customary international law such as force majeure,
state of necessity, or self-defense to justify jus cogens violations. 24 Rather,
international law has already balanced military necessity with humanita-
rian considerations in declaring jus cogens. Furthermore, any treaty pur-
porting to authorize derogations from a jus cogens would itself be void ab
initio.25 Accordingly, religious minorities should be safe from at least
genocide, slavery and torture. Unfortunately, the next three sections
demonstrate that they are not.
A. Religious Minorities Slaughtered
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide defines genocide as
[A]ny of the following acts, committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing mem-
bers of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu-
lated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) impos-
ing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or (e) forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.
2 6
Genocide, the most heinous crime under international law, is uncondition-
ally prohibited.27 Nevertheless, genocide inspired in large measure by reli-
gious differences has occurred throughout the twentieth century, most
notably in Armenia, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. In the 1990s,
genocide has also occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sudan.
The following section explores the Armenian, Bosnian, and Sudanese
genocides to delineate the distinctive characteristics of religiously-inspired
genocide. The investigation reveals a number of distinguishing features,
including scapegoating, mass migration, rape intended to propagate the
majority's religious beliefs, deportation, forced conversion, the targeting of
religio-cultural symbols, and propaganda justifying genocide in terms of
See RANDALL, supra note 4, at 163-64. See also RESTATEMENT (THiP) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS § 702 (1986) (stating that the following practices violate international law: (1)
genocide, (2) slavery or slave trade, (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals, (4) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
(5) prolonged arbitrary detention, (6) systematic racial discrimination, and (7) a consis-
tent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights); RESTATE.
m'wrr (THimD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 cmt. j (1986) ("[T]here is a strong case that
systematic discrimination on grounds of religion as a matter of state policy is also a
violation of customary law.").
23. See RANDALL, supra note 4, at 163-64.
24. See THEODOR MERON, HuMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMs As CUSTOMARY
LAw 20-21, 215-22 (1989).
25. See id. at 220-21.
26. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1998, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 227 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (emphasis added).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 cmt. d (1986) also references this defini-
tion of genocide.
27. See Genocide Convention, supra note 26, art. 1, at 31-34; see also MERON, supra
note 24, at 20.
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national security and welfare. Most distinctively, religiously-inspired geno-
cide is usually the instrument of political leaders who are themselves secu-
lar and nationalistic, but view religion and theology as powerful tools for
achieving geo-political ends.
1. Armenian Genocide
In 1915, the Young Turks killed an estimated 1 to 1.5 million Armenian
Christians in an effort to solve the so-called Armenian problem.28 Accord-
ing to the Young Turks, the Armenians caused disunity, conflict, and even
treachery.29 Although predominantly secular themselves, the Young Turks
"recognized the pervasive influence of Islam in the country and resolved to
exploit it in their plans to eliminate the source of domestic nationality con-
flicts."30 They began by passing laws officially expropriating and plunder-
ing the goods and assets of Armenians and conscripting Armenian men
into the military, where they were shot in cold blood in squads of fifty or
more, or ordered to certain death in military engagements. 3 ' Then, the
Young Turks implemented a massive deportation scheme from which the
Armenians never returned.3 2 They emptied Turkish prisons of convicted
criminals and dispatched them to raid and exterminate Armenian con-
voys.3 3 The death toll was enormous: "By official Turkish accounts, alone,
those directly killed numbered about 800,000, not counting the tens of
thousands of wartime conscripts liquidated by the military."34 Armenian
women and children who survived the mass killings were forced to convert
to Islam.3 5 According to the Allies, at the end of World War I, the Turks
also "dishonored" women and even engaged in slavery.36
28. See Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law:
The World War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J.
INT'L L. 221, 223, 229, 270 (1989).
29. See id. at 253, 263-64.
30. Id. at 232.
31. See id. at 267-77.
32. See id. at 262-67, 272-73.
33. See id. at 274-77.
34. Id. at 272.
35. See id. at 273.
36. See id. at 280. The Allies reported the following violations against civil popula-
tions in 1919:
systematic terror; murders and massacres; dishonoring of women; confiscation
of private property; pillage; seizing of goods belonging to communities, educa-
tional establishments and charities; arbitrary destruction of public and private
goods; deportation and forced labor; execution of civilians under false allega-
tions of war crimes; and violations against civilians as well as military
personnel.
Id. See also ALAN DESTEKHE, RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTiETH CENTURY 22-23
(Alison Marschner trans., 1995). Dextexhe noted that:
Rape, the splitting-up of families, forced conversions of women to Islam.. .o. the
ideology of the Young Turk movement and the methods they used to uproot,
displace and eventually wipe out the Armenians all belong to the twentieth cen-
tury. They used such tactics as splitting up the victims by separating the leaders
from their people, the strong and able-bodied from the weak and infirm, the
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Initially, the Young Turks attempted to conceal their final plan for the
Armenians, agreeing to implement reforms designed to afford non-Muslims
equality under the law while ensuring that the reforms never took effect,
and playing the hegemons against one another.37 Gradually, however,
Turkish propaganda openly began to characterize the Armenians as a
threat to national security.38 As one legal scholar commented, "govern-
ments less stupid than that of National Socialist Germany will never admit
the intent to destroy a group as such, but will tell the world that they are
acting against the traitors .... -39
Emboldened by the failure of the Allies to intervene, Turkish officials
responded brazenly in May 1915 to the Allies' threat to hold them responsi-
ble for the ongoing massacre. Istanbul alleged that it had a "duty to resort
to any measure it deem[ed] appropriate for safeguarding the security of its
borders" and thus "that it ha[d] no obligation whatsoever to give an
account to any foreign government."4 ° Istanbul also insisted that killing
Armenians was theologically justified, because the Shari'a (Islamic law)
"prescribes that if the 'rayah' [cattle] Christian attempts, by having
recourse to foreign powers, to overstep the limits of privileges allowed to
them by their Mussulman masters, and free themselves from their bondage,
their lives and property are to be forfeited, and are at the mercy of the
Mussulmans."
4 1
The Allies, who had repeatedly defeated the Turks on the battlefield,
declined to prevent the slaughter and "failed to secure the punishment of
the perpetrators," causing many to call the Armenian genocide "the forgot-
ten genocide." 42 Indeed, in trying to assuage the doubts some had con-
cerning his Final Solution, Hitler said, "Who, after all, speaks today of the
annihilation of the Armenians?" 43 Hitler went on to kill an estimated 5.1
million Jews, and at least 75,000 Catholics, employing many of the same
strategies the Turkish Government used successfully against Armenians in
1915. At Nuremberg, the Allies cried "never again." Nevertheless, roughly
fifty years later, the Serbs settled on a Final Solution of their own for
Bosnia.
women who could be converted, etc., and by imposing constant hardships on
the deportees in order to demoralise them....
Id.
37. See Dadrian, supra note 28, at 241-42, 318-19.
38. See id. at 264. Dadrina explained that
In order to justify this enormous crime.., the requisite propaganda material
was thoroughly prepared in Istanbul. [It included such statements as:] "[T]he
Armenians are in league with the enemy. They will launch an uprising in Istan-
bul, kill off the Itihadist leaders and will succeed in opening up the straits... to
enable the Allied fleets to capture Istanbul. .. "
Id. (quoting A. RE'K, Io KoMITE h KITAL [Two COMMUNITIES AND Two MASsACRES] 40
(1919)).
39. Dadrian, supra note 28, at 278.
40. Id. at 277-78.
41. Id. at 243.
42. Id. at 223-24.
43. Id. at 225 (quoting K. BARDA JIAN, HTLER AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 6 (1985)).
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2. Bosnian Genocide
The Bosnian genocide began in the spring of 1992. Predominantly Ortho-
dox Christian Serbs mass raped, murdered, and starved Muslims, as part
of an intentional program of so-called "ethnic cleansing," i.e., a "purposeful
policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and
terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or reli-
gious group from certain geographic areas."4 4 Like the population of the
former Yugoslavia itself, the Serb leadership was predominately secular.
45
But like most nationalists, Serb leaders viewed religion as a tool "to create
or amplify differences beyond those that already existed."4 6 To be sure,
historical enmities separated Serbs from Croats and Albanians alike,. "[b]ut
when all was said and done, the only truly irreducible definition of what
identified individual Croats, Serbs and Muslims ethnically, and equally
important, distinguished them from each other, was religion-more
exactly, in many cases, religious origin, since most people in the former
Yugoslavia were secular."4 7
While the total number of Muslims killed in Bosnia is still unknown,
conservative estimates indicate that at least ten percent of the Muslim pop-
ulation or 200,000 to 250,000 Muslims died.48 Serbs set up death and
rape camps across the countryside,4 9 while officially denying the existence
of these camps. 50 Professional people, local notables, and young, able-bod-
ied men were usually the first targeted in an intentional effort to denude
Bosnia of its elites. 51 Those not killed in this "elitocide" were divided into
44. BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA-HERzEGOVINA
AND CROATA 44-45 (1996) (citing the FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS EsTAB-
LISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLIYrON 33, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994)
[hereinafter BASSIOUNI REPORT]). The Bassiouni Report adds that ethnic cleansing in the
region "is essentially based on ethnic and religious exclusivity and the dominance of
Serbs over other groups in certain historically claimed areas." Id. at 45.
45. See DAVID RIEFF, SLAUGHTERHOUSE BOSNIA AND THE FAILURE OF THE WEST 68-69
(1995).
46. Id. at 68.
47. Id.
48. See Roy GU'mAN, A WITNEss TO GENOCIDE xxxi (1993); see also ALLEN, supra note
44, at 47; Rimm, supra note 45, at 23. Bosnians are also alleged to have committed war
crimes, but Serb atrocities clearly outnumbered Bosnian war crimes. See Bosnian Ref u-
gees, Hearing before the Subcom. On Int'l Operations and Human Rights Comm. on Int'l
Relations of the House of Rep., 104th Cong. 1st Sess. 17-18, 21, 47 (1995) [hereinafter
Bosnian Refugees].
49. See GTmMAN, supra note 48, at xxxii.
50. See id. at 54 ("The Serbian side energetically denies the existence of camps for
civilians anywhere in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.").
51. See RiE-F, supra note 45, at 113. Refugees recounted ghastly stories of human
suffering and mass exterminations at these camps, such as the following:
Sometimes the prisoners were subject to horrible mutilations before they were
tossed into the Sava. "The very worst day.. . was when I saw 10 young men laid
out in a row. They had their throats slit, their noses cut off and their genitals
plucked out...." The first to be executed were the Muslim political party mem-
bers and Bosnian home guard, he said. "They called out names, took out the
prisoners, and started killing. We would hear three shots, and the man would
not come back"... But they soon switched methods and began slitting throats
of prisoners.. . . "They would tell them to lie down and put their head on a
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two groups: (1) Bosnians about whom the Serbs were still "undecided"
were placed in "intelligence camps," where some were later killed; and (2)
Bosnian peasants and poor townspeople were sent to "open centers," desig-
nated for Red Cross inspections and marked for release from the start.
52
Serbs also raped as many as 60,000 Muslim women and girls, result-
ing in more than 30,000 unwanted pregnancies.5 3 This was part of one or
more conscious military strategies, known as the Serbian "Ram Plan" or
"Brana Plan," aimed at undermining the religious and social structure
where Serbs believed it was most fragile.54 Some Serbian soldiers were
assigned "rape duty," sleeping during the day and raping at night, often "in
particularly sadistic ways, so as to inflict maximum humiliation on the vic-
tims, on their family, and on the whole community."5 5 One refugee
remembered the following:
[There were] repeated rapes of girls as young as 6 and 7; violations by neigh-
bors and strangers alike; gang rapes so brutal their victims died; rape camps
where Serbs routinely abused and murdered Muslim and Croat women;
rapes of young girls performed in front of fathers, mothers, siblings and
children; rapes committed explicitly to impregnate Muslim women and hold
them captive until they give birth to unwanted Serbian babies.
56
Unfortunately, in many instances, the communities in which the raped
women lived refused thereafter to accept them back to avoid becoming
known as a "community of 'raped women,"' contributing to the profound
shame, defilement, and guilt raped women felt.
5 7
In July 1992, the Serbs also began a policy of forced deportation; in
one instance, they chartered an eighteen-car train to expel all of the Bosni-
ans from the village of Kozluk, some 1800 people.58 Elsewhere Bosnians
were forced to undertake "death marches," so named because most were
killed while fleeing starvation and bombardment in search of safety and
food.59 On one such march, between 7000 and 17,500 Bosnians who
concrete block. The guards would cut their throats."... The bodies were posi-
tioned so that the blood flowed into the Sava.
GuTm , supra note 48, at 51.
52. See RIEFF, supra note 45, at 113.
53. See Sharon A. Healey, Prosecuting Rape Under the Statute of the War Crimes Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia, 21 BRooK. J. INT'L L. 327, 361, 372 (1995). Serbs alleged
in the early part of the war that Bosnians implemented a similar policy against Serbian
women. See GurmAN, supra note 48, at 164 (repeating a Serbian tract stating, "[b]y order
of the Islamic fundamentalists from Sarajevo, healthy Serbian women from 17 to 40
years of age are being separated out and subject to special treatment. According to their
sick plans ... these women have to be impregnated by orthodox Islamic seeds in order
to raise a generation of janissaries. . . ."); ALLEN, supra note 44, at 47.
54. See ALLEN, supra note 44, at 57-59 ("'Brana' means 'dam'; thus the Serb military
policy will 'dam up' the Muslim population, keep it elsewhere, keep it from the territo-
ries Serbia wants to take.").
55. Healey, supra note 53, at 372; see also GutmA, supra note 48, at 164 (noting
"one woman at Partisan... was raped more than 100 times in two months").
56. Healey, supra note 53, at 327.
57. Id. at 340, 350.
58. See GurwAN, supra note 48, at 20.
59. See Bosnian Refugees, supra note 48, at 60.
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escaped extermination in Srebrenica marched sixty miles through Serb-
held territory and Serb-led ambushes that depleted their numbers to a
handful.
60
Ultimately, Serb-backed assaults on Bosnia created the largest flood of
refugees in Europe since World War II; some 1.5 million people lost their
homes and were forced to flee to overcrowded, impoverished refugee
camps, where starvation and disease raised the war's death toll.6 1 Serbs
also targeted Bosnian religious symbols and leaders. Serbs executed as
many as thirty-seven imams, sent thirty-five to concentration camps, and
expelled 300 from Bosnia.62 The London Guardian estimated that Serbs
also destroyed as many as 800 mosques, many of them historical monu-
ments dating from as early as the sixteenth century.63 Serbs used other
mosques for prisons, slaughterhouses, and morgues, thereby desecrating
them.64 They targeted libraries, including those with collections of rare
books and manuscripts, and religious seminaries "for reasons that had
nothing to do with military strategy."65 Serbs also forced religious leaders
to desecrate mosques or to cross themselves on pain of torture and, usu-
ally, execution.66
3. Sudanese Genocide
In 1989, the Sudan also undertook a systematic campaign to exterminate
religious minorities, namely the Christians and animists in the south67 and
the Muslim Beja people in the north.68 The Sudan gained its independence
in 1956, following almost fifty years of British colonial administration that
had reinforced geographic, racial, and religious differences between Arabs
and non-Arabs by establishing separate governing provinces and imposing
restrictions on north-south trade.6 9 British colonial administration also
60. See id. at 85-87.
61. See Gui-MAN, supra note 48, at 21, 107-08.
62. See id. at 80.
63. See id. at 79, 83; see also RiE'F, supra note 45, at 26, 97 (estimating that, where
there had been 1000 mosques, by the winter of 1994 "there were certainly no more than
a hundred and probably far fewer").
64. See GuTMAN, supra note 48, at 81-82.
65. Id. at 77, 79, 81.
66. See id. at 78.
67. See NINA SHEA, IN THE LION'S DEN: A SHOCKING ACCOUNT OF PERSECUTION AND
MARTYRDoM OF CHRISTIANS TODAY & How WE SHOULD RESPOND 31-35 (1996).
68. See Slavery in Mauritania and Sudan: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l
Operations and Human Rights and Africa of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1996) [hereinafter Slavery] (statement by Baroness Caroline Cox,
Deputy Speaker, House of Lords) ("The government's policy toward the people of the
South and the Nuba Mountains is tantamount to genocide by means of terror, war, slav-
ery, the mass displacement of the population, and the manipulation of aid.").
69. See Mansour Khalid, The Southern Sudan Settlement and Its African Implications,
in THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AFTER TEN YEARS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTMVES
175-79 (Yassin EI-Ayouty ed., 1975). See also Angela M. Lloyd, The Southern Sudan: A
Compelling Case for Secession, 32 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 419,439-42 (1994) ("From the
first, British authorities treated the three southern provinces as a separate region to
which access by northerners was limited." (citing Robert Rinehart, Historical Settings, in
Cornell International Law Journal
left the south less developed than the north.70 Post-colonial Sudan thus
encompassed "two distinctive peoples, an Arabic-speaking, Muslim North
and an English-speaking, Christian (and, often, still animist) South, in one
country."
71
The first Sudanese civil war began on the eve of independence in 1955
and lasted until 1972.72 That year, the north and south entered into the
Addis Ababa Agreement, according to which the south was to gain new
internal autonomy and equitable national representation. 73 However, hos-
tilities erupted again in the late 1970s when these promises were not
kept.7 4 The war was sporadic, until a military junta led by Lieutenant Gen-
eral Omar Hasan al-Bashir (al-Bashir) assumed control of the Sudan in a
1989 coup. He immediately played the religious card that his predecessor,
General Gaafar al-Nimiery, had increasingly invoked to legitimize his gov-
ernment and mask his own agenda and began profiting from a permanent
state of war and arms trading.75 In the words of one journalist, the
National Islamic Front was designed as
an ingenious hybrid, a cross between a theocracy and a Mafia syndicate.
True believers provide the cannon fodder, in the form of a heavily indoctri-
nated Islamist militia modeled after Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Mean-
while, an elite cabal of generals, Islamic bankers, arms merchants, currency
swindlers, land appropriators, cattle raiders, oil prospectors and outright
slave traders - through the patronage of their godfather, Turabi - muscle
their way into the profits of war. Sudan's big men have excelled in their
peculiar environment by mastering two intertwined requirements of power.
The first is the art of manipulating potent symbols, masking one's personal
agenda in a larger legitimizing cause .... The second requirement is to
attach this larger cause to the economic forces that predominate in condi-
tions of total anarchy .... For Turabi, the mask is Islam.
7 6
Referring to the south's opposition as a "Western and Zionist plot against
Islam," al-Bashir deployed government troops and government-backed Pop-
ular Defense Forces (PDF) systematically to rid the Sudan of individuals
unwilling to recognize Shari'a law.7 7 By 1997, these forces had slaugh-
tered an estimated 1.5 to 3 million Sudanese and displaced between fifty to
eighty-five percent of the population of southern Sudan, or roughly five to
SUDAN: A CouNTRY STUDY 40 (1982)). See generally PETER WOODWARD, SUDAN, 1898-
1989: THE UNSTABLE STATE (1990).
70. See Khalid, supra note 69, at 178-79 (noting for example that upon indepen-
dence, only six of roughly 800 jobs the British and Egyptians vacated passed to
southerners).
71. Lloyd, supra note 69, at 443.
72. See id. at 441.
73. See id. at 446.
74. See id. at 448.
75. See Lloyd, supra note 69, at 448 (discussing al-Nimiery's decision to disregard
the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, impose Shari'a in Southern sudan, and thereby
destroy any facade of national unity).
76. Bill Berkeley, The Longest War in the World, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 3, 1996, at 59-
60. Hasan A-Turabi is the ideological father of Islamization in Sudan. He currently
serves as Speaker of Parliament.
77. See id.
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eight million people.78 In 1998, roughly 4.5 million people remained inter-
nally displaced, most along the Ethiopian and Ugandan border.79
One of the Sudanese government's most powerful weapons is food,
which it withholds from the south to compel migration and even Islamiza-
tion.80 Non-Muslims are denied food, clothing, and shelter unless they
convert to Islam.8 ' In addition, the government loots and destroys
predominantly Christian and animist villages, burns crops, tortures and
rapes villagers, and abandons Sudanese in the desert without food or
water.8 2 The Nuba Mountains, where a Christian population has existed
since the sixth century, are littered with mass graves, the remains of
destroyed villages, and camps where women and children are enslaved.
83
Arab soldiers systematically rape Nuba women to produce non-Nuba off-
spring.84 PDF forces also target churches and religio-cultural symbols and
harass and kill Christian clergy. In the Nuba region, the government burns
mosques as well as churches, then refuses to issue re-building permits.
8 5
There are also widespread reports that the army is crucifying Christians in
remote areas of the Sudan.86
B. Religious Minorities Enslaved
Certain regimes currently subject their religious minorities to slavery, even
though international customary law banning slavery and the slave trade
dates back to 1807, when Great Britain forbade both in the Common-
wealth. Thereafter, the Vienna Declaration of 1815 declared the slave trade
"repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality" and as "a
scourge which has so long [sic] desolated Africa, degraded Europe, and
afflicted humanity."87 From 1815 until the 1960s, a series of international
human rights instruments expanded the definition of slavery to activities
78. See Slavery, supra note 68, at 48; see also Berkeley, supra note 76, at 60; PAUL
MARSHALL, THEIR BLOOD CRIES Our: THE WORLDWIDE TRAGEDY OF MODERN CHRISTIANS
WHO ARE DYING FOR THEIR FAITH 23 (1997); Joseph PI Gregory, African Slavery 1996, 63
FIRST THINGS 37 (1996).
79. See AMNEST INTERNATIONAL USA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1998 315
(1998) [hereinafter 1998 AMNESTY REPORT].
80. See Slavery, supra note 68, at 48; see also MARSHALL, supra note 78, at 21; AFICAN
RIGHTS, SUDAN'S INVISIBLE CITZENs: THE POLICY OF ABUSE AGAINST DISPLACED PEOPLE IN
THE NORTH (1995) (discussing Sudan's scorched-earth campaign and politically induced
famine).
81. See MARSHALL, supra note 78, at 21.
82. See Slavery, supra note 68, at 47-48; see also SHEA, supra note 67, at 31-35; Berke-
ley, supra note 76, at 61 ("The U.N. invests $2 million per week in Operation Lifeline
Sudan, but, say U.N. relief workers, 'They use our food to fuel their war.... It's a racket
with the chiefs. It's like a business cartell [sic].'"); 1998 AMNEsTY REPORT, supra note 79,
at 317.
83. See MARSHALL, supra note 78, at 21.
84. See id. at 21-22.
85. See id. at 20; see generally U.S. DPT STATE, UNITED STATES POLICIES IN SUPPORT OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: Focus ON CHRISTIANS (1997) [hereinafter REPORT ON RELIGIOUS
FREEDoMI.
86. See MARSHALL, supra note 78, at 22; SHEA, supra note 67, at 32.
87. McDOUGAL Er AL., supra note 2, at 485.
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such as prostitution and corrective labor, reinforcing the norm opposed to
servitude.88
The Slavery Convention of 192689 provided that all necessary meas-
ures shall be taken to prevent compulsory or forced labor from developing
into conditions analogous to. slavery; the Supplementary Convention on
the Abolition of Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slav-
ery,90 adopted in 1956, provided for the complete abolition of debt bond-
age and serfdom without reservation. 91 More recently, the Convention
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor 92 forbade compulsory labor as a
means of political coercion or education; racial, social, national, or reli-
gious discrimination; and punishment for holding or expressing political
views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social, or
economic system.93 Evaluating this evolution of the anti-slavery norm over
more than 150 years, one commentator observed:
[T]he right to freedom of the person, and the concomitant prohibition of
slavery and the slave trade, have by now not only become matters of concern
to international law but are subject to established rules of international law;
one may indeed say that by the middle of the twentieth century it was clear
that there was a customary rule of international law according to which slav-
ery and the slave trade are prohibited. 94
Nevertheless, according to Anti-Slavery International, the world's oldest
human rights organization, over 200 million people continue to live in
some form of human bondage.
95
88. For a fuller explanation of these treaties addressing slavery, including the Treaty
of London of 1841, the General Act of the Brussels Conference of 1890, the Covenant of
the League of Nations and Mandate System, the Slavery Convention of 1926, the U.N.
Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter Universal Declara-
tion), the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation
of the Prostitution of Others, the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Convention on the
Abolition of Forced Labour, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
European Convention on Human Rights, and the American Convention on Human
Rights, see McDouGAL Er AL., supra note 2, at 482-505. See also Renee C. Redman, The
League of Nations and The Right to be Free from Enslavement: The First Human Right to be
Recognized as Customary International Law, 70 CHI.-YEW L. REv. 759 (1994).
89. Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, amended by
Protocol of 7 December 1953, 2121 U.N.T.S. 17.
90. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S.
3.
91. See id.; see also MERON, supra note 24, at 20-21.
92. International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Aboli-
tion of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 [hereinafter Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention].
93. See id.
94. A.H. ROBERTSON, HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD: AN INTRODucnON TO THE STUDY
OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTS 16-17 (1982).
95. See CharlesJacobs, Slavery: Worldwide Evil (1997) (unpublished manuscript of
the American Anti-Slavery Group) (text available at <http://www.anti-slavery.org/
mlsc.html> (visited Mar. 1, 1999)).
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1. Chattel Slavery
Chattel slavery, in contrast to serfdom or indentured servitude, gives a
master complete ownership and control of all of his slave's life decisions,
including whether, when, and whom slaves may marry; whether slaves
may have children, and whether these children may be sold; and whether
slaves may possess property.9 6 Historically, chattel slaves were subjected
to every type of physical torture, including castration, female circumcision,
branding with identification marks, mutilation, and sexual molestation,
including service as concubines and the "bride price."97 These indicia of
chattel slavery are widespread in the Sudan in conjunction with the perse-
cution of religious minorities.
The Sudanese government has impressed tens of thousands of chil-
dren into chattel slavery since the mid-1990s, despite outlawing slavery in
the Constitution and officially denying that the practice exists.98 In their
raids on predominantly Christian and animist villages in the South, gov-
ernment forces and the PDF kidnap children and young women to con-
script them into military service or sell them to provide domestic,
agricultural, and sexual services to Muslims in the north of the country.99
Since the Muja Hadeen, or warriors of the jihad, are poorly paid, the gov-
ernment encourages warriors in the PDF to take these so-called "spoils of
war."100 Likewise, the government began financing a Ugandan armed
opposition force (the "Lord's Resistance Army") in 1998, by providing a
market in the Sudan for abducted Ugandan children. 1 1
The average price per slave has varied with the supply of slaves on the
market. In the mid-1990s, observers reported prices ranging from five to
96. See McDOUGAL Er AL., supra note 2, at 474-75.
97. See id. at 475-76.
98. See Slavery, supra note 68, at 64 (statement by Augustine Lado, President, Pax
Sudani) (guessing that far more than 10,000 children have been sold into slavery and
choosing to use the phrase tens of thousands of children); see also SHEA, supra note 67, at
33-34 (Christian Solidarity International (CSI) estimates that more than 25,000 children
from the Nuba Mountains region alone have been abducted and sold into slavery);
Steven A. Holmes, Slavery is an Issu Again, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 24, 1996, at 18 (government
denies existence of slavery, despite widespread reports of it); Gilbert A. Lewthwaite &
Gregory Kane, Sudan Denies Slavery But. . . ., BAT. SUN, June 18, 1996, at A9.
99. See Slavery, supra note 68, at 47-48; see also SHEA, supra note 67, at 32 ("To
eradicate the Christian and non-Muslim population, the Sudanese government and its
agents have bombed, burned and looted southern villages, enslaved women and chil-
dren, kidnapped and forcibly converted Christian and other boys and sent them into
battle, relocated entire villages into concentration camps called 'peace villages,' and
withheld food aid to starving Christian and animist communities until they converted to
Islam."); American Anti-Slavery Group, Slave Raids Continue in Sudan, June 20, 1997
(unpublished press release, on file with author); Ai Esnr IERNATIONAL, THE TEARS OF
ORPHANS: No FUTURE WImTour HumAN RIGHTS (1995); HuMAN RIGHTS WATcH/AmRICA,
CHILDREN OF SUDAN: SLAVES, STREET CHILDREN, AND CHILD SOLDIERS (1995).
100. See Slavery, supra note 68, at 52 (statement by Kevin Vigilante, Clinical Associate
Professor of Medicine, Brown University School of Medicine); see also Holmes, supra
note 98, at 1:18; Christian Solidarity International, CSI Visit to Sudan, (Oct. 23-28,
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
101. 1998 AmNEmSTY REPORT, supra 79, at 317.
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ten head of cattle or one automatic rifle, a value of $300 to $500.102 More
recently, observers report there is a flooded market, so slaves in the Sudan
can be bought for as little as $15, depending on their age and physical
condition.10 3 Sudanese and Ugandan children are processed through vari-
ous camps in the north of the country; the estimated number of these
camps ranges from scores to hundreds.10 4 Christians slaves are generally
given Muslim names and "forced to observe Muslim rituals."' 0 5 They are
tortured, sexually abused, indoctrinated in Islam, and even killed, unless
they renounce their faith.10 6 The State Department and charitable organi-
zations working in Sudan estimate that between 90,000-100,000 persons
are enslaved, and another 300,000 are psychologically and/or economi-
cally dependent on their former slave masters.
10 7
Authorities require some boys to attend Koranic schools or PDF train-
ing camps, "where they are trained to wage war against their own peo-
ple."'1 8 Girls are purchased to serve as concubines. 10 9 Slave traders
brand children and adults with marks for identification, castrate them,
and, in some instances, cut their Achilles tendons so that they cannot run
away." 0 Some children are exported to neighboring Libya;"' others are
ransomed. 112 Sudanese Bishop Macram Max Gassis testified before Con-
gress that half a score of parents or relatives had approached him for
money to be given to abductors to liberate children and women.1 1 3 Conse-
quently, Catholic missionaries lament,
Nothing has changed in the way of life of these Arab groups for the past
hundred years, .... Their only progress has consisted in the provision of
large amounts of modern weapons and up-to-date transportation. [Although
t]he time of long lines of enchained slaves marching north is over... [niow
truckloads of children are seen moving in the same traditional direction. 
1 14
102. See Slavery, supra note 68, at 47 (price of slave is five head of cattle); see also
Walter Goodman, Television Review: Reports of Slavery in a Divided Land, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 10, 1996, at C20 (price of slave is usually $300 worth of cattle, but when Christian
Solidarity International (CSI) buys them back to return them to their homes, the price is
$500); MARSHALL, supra note 78, at 21.
103. See SHEA, supra note 67, at 33; MARSHALL, supra note 78, at 21; Gregory, supra
note 78, at 37; Jacobs, supra note 95, at 6.
104. See Slavery, supra note 68, at 64; see also 1998 AmNEs-Y REPORT, supra 79, at 317.
105. Id. at 47.
106. See id. at 47-48, 65.
107. See Charles Jacobs & Mohamed Athie, Bought and Sold, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
1994, at A2; see also CSI's "Underground Railroad" Liberates a Further 5,514 Slaves;
20,961 Sudanese Slaves Freed Since 1995 (Dec. 22, 1999) <http//www.csi-int.ch/spe-
cial0l.html> (adding that Christian Solidarity International (CSI) has redeemed a total
of 20,961 slaves since 1995 by paying roughly $50 per person).
108. Id. at 47.
109. See id. at 65.
110. See MARSHALL, supra note 78, at 21; Gregory, supra note 78, at 37.
111. SeeJacobs, supra note 95, at 6.
112. See Gregory, supra note 78, at 37.
113. See id. at 39.
114. Id. at 37.
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2. Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor also continues in many countries. Such labor
is used
as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding
or expressing political views ideologically opposed to the established polit-
ical, social, or economic system; as a method of mobilizing and using labor
for purposes of economic development; as a means of labor discipline; as a
punishment for having participated in strikes; or as a means of racial, social,
national, or religious discrimination.
1 5
The United States led the world community in opposition to the Soviet
Union's treatment of Jews, Christians, Gypsies, and Muslims in Soviet
gulags (labor camps), as revealed in lurid detail in Aleksandr Solzhenit-
syn's The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956.116 However, as a result of the
United States' policy of "constructive engagement" toward China, the
United States essentially ignores the Chinese laogai system, concerning
which Solzhenitsyn could have written an equally grim portrait of human
suffering. Human rights activist Harry Wu said that
[t]he core of the human rights issue in China today is that there is a funda-
mental machinery for crushing human beings-physically, psychologically,
and spiritually-called the laogai camp system, of which we have identified
eleven hundred separate camps. It is also an integral part of the national
economy. Its importance is illustrated by the fact that one-third of China's
tea is produced in laogai camps. Sixty percent of China's rubber vulcanizing
chemicals are produced in a single laogai camp in Shenyang. One of the
largest steel pipe works in the country is a laogai camp .... 117
Beginning in the 1950s, Mao Zedong executed and imprisoned in
reeducation camps thousands of Christians, Muslims, and Tibetan Bud-
dhists to rid China of "foreign influences." 1 8 Although the level of reli-
gious oppression has varied over the years, repression has increased
dramatically since 1988.119 At the end of 1993, Chinese authorities admit-
ted that 120,000 prisoners were undergoing "re-education through
labor."120 Many believe the actual number of prisoners is much higher.12 1
115. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, supra note 92, art. 1(a)-(e).
116. See generally THE GULAG ARCwIPELAGO, 1918-1956: AN EXPERIMENT IN LITERARY
INVESTIGATION (Thomas P. Witney & Harry T. Willetts trans., 1999); AMNEST INTERNA-
TIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN TE USSR1 THEIR TREATMENT AND CONDITONS
(1975).
117. Nina Shea, Free Harry Wu, Finsr FREEDOM 2 (1995).
118. See MARSHALL, supra note 78, at 76-78.
119. See id. at 79.
120. Id. at 77.
121. See id. See also AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, THE 1996 REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTs
AROUND THE WORLD 118-19 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 AmNESTY REPORT]. The Report
notes that
'Re-education through labour,' a form of administrative detention, continued to
be used to arbitrarily detain dissidents... without charge or trial for up to three
years.... Hundreds of Roman Catholics and Protestants were detained....
Thousands of political prisoners detained without trial or convicted after unfair
trials in previous years remained held. Many were prisoners of conscience. In
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From October to November 1998, Chinese authorities detained approxi-
mately 140 house church worshipers who had attended services in central
Henan; forty house church members were beaten and detained in Liuwan,
and another 100 persons were beaten and detained in Nanyang.
122
Authorities also detained Xu Yongze, leader of the "New Born" Church in
Henan, and seven other Christians in March 1998, sentencing all eight to
ten years' imprisonment for "disturbing the public order."'
1 23
The crackdown on suspected Muslim nationalists in the Xingiang
Autonomous Region and on Tibetan nationalists and religious groups in
the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) also continued in 1998.124 At the
beginning of the year, authorities detained over 650 Tibetan political pris-
oners, primarily Buddhist prisoners of conscience; an unknown number of
these prisoners were sent to re-education camps for expressing reverence
for the Dalai Lama. 125 In June, Amnesty International reported that
ninety-eight Tibetans had been sentenced to prison terms for "endangering
national security."1
26
An unknown number of Chinese undergoing re-education through
labor become unwilling subjects of tissue and organ harvesting. 127
According to reports, Chinese authorities find a prisoner with the correct
blood and tissue type, execute him or her, and then harvest the prisoners'
kidneys, corneas, and other organs. 128 At the end of 1996, roughly 8759
Chinese kidney transplants occurred, 90% of which used organs from
death row inmates. 129
Other communist countries, including Vietnam and North Korea, have
labor camp systems. In the 1990s, Vietnam primarily has targeted Bud-
dhists affiliated with the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), but
the government has also subjected Catholics and Hmong Protestants
involved in the house church movement to detention and forced labor.130
January, a Ministry of Justice official stated that 2,678 people convicted of
'counter-revolutionary offences' were imprisoned. This figure excluded many
more held for political reasons but convicted of other offences....
Id.
122. See U.S. DEP'T STATE, CouNTy REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998,
Report Submitted to the Committee on Int'l Relations, U.S. House of Representatives,
and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 22, 25 (1999) [hereinafter 1998
CouNR-Y REPORT].
123. 1998 AMNEsty REPORT, supra 79, at 131.
124. See id. at 130.
125. See 1996 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 121, at 119 ("In the first three months of
[19961 ... 50 nuns and 68 monks, most of whom were prisoners of conscience [were
detained.]"); REPORT ON RELIGIOUs FREEDOM, supra note 85.
126. 1998 AMNESTY REPORT, supra 79, at 130.
127. See U.S./China Relations and Human Rights: Is Constructive Engagement Work-
ing? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations and Human Rights of the House of
Rep. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th Cong., 12-14 (1997) [hereinafter Constructive
Engagement] (statement of Harry Wu, Exec. Dir., The Laogai Research Foundation).
128. See id. at 14.
129. See id.
130. See SHEA, supra note 67, at 70-77; 1998 CoUNTRY REPORT, supra note 122, at 9-10;
1996 AMNEsT REPORT, supra note 121, at 322-23 (at least seven Catholic priests of the
Congregation of the Mother Co-Redemptrix were arrested in 1987 and convicted of
2000 Human Rights Imperative
-In March 1997, in the wake of the U.S. decision not to raise human rights
objections at the Human Rights Commission, Vietnam announced that it
would move four UBCV leaders to "re-education labor camps"; the
Supreme Patriarch of the UBCV and its Secretary General remain in deten-
tion. 131 In addition, at least seventy-five Buddhist monks are imprisoned,
"and tens of thousands of followers have either been detained, are living in
exile, are in jail, or have been executed."132 The prisons where they are
kept are the same ones used to "re-educate" South Vietnamese soldiers. 133
According to one activist, the prisons are "really death camps, although
their sentence is three years, their chances of coming back alive are
slim.'1
34
Similarly, beginning in the mid-1960s, Kim I1 Sung rounded up reli-
gious leaders in North Korea and sent those he did not execute to a net-
work of hidden labor camps.135 The State Department estimates that
between 150,000 and 200,000 Koreans are detained in these concentration
camps. 136 The number of religious minorities forced to work in them is
unknown. 137 Inmates work on national construction projects, logging,
and cropping.138 Reports suggest that adult inmates are forced to work up
to sixteen hours per day (ten hours per day for children), despite severe
malnutrition and starvation resulting from three consecutive years of
severe food shortages in North Korea.139 Defectors report gruesome types
of torture in the labor camps, such as the following:
Mrs. Li, a former store manager, says she was falsely accused of embezzle-
ment as punishment for refusing to make payoffs to a policeman. She says
she was beaten, stripped, sexually abused and tortured for months. Some-
times, she recounts, she was tied to a bed, forced to drink huge amounts of
water from the long spout of a kettle that was forced into her mouth. The
only way to avoid drowning was to drink, but then when her belly was round
and full, the guards would put a board on her abdomen and stamp on it
until she vomited.140
"sowing disunity between the people and the government"); 1998 AMNi.Sm'T REPORT,
supra 79, at 359 (they were still detained in 1999, despite worsening health); MARsHALL,
supra note 78, at 86.
131. See 1998 AMNES REPORT, supra 79, at 359.
132. Buddhist Monks in Vietnam Face Certain Death, UPI, March 11, 1997. Many Bud-
dhist leaders have been arrested for "undermining the policy of unity." 1996 AmNmsrY
REPORT, supra note 121, at 323.
133. See 1996 AmNs-y REPORT, supra note 121, at 323.
134. Id.
135. See SHEA, supra note 67, at 68.
136. See 1998 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 122, at 954.
137. See MAIsHALL, supra note 78, at 95-96.
138. See 1998 CoUNTRY REPORT, supra note 122, at 14.
139. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Survivors Report Torture in North Korea Labor Camps,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 14, 1996, at 3; see also 1998 AMNESTY REPORT, supra 79, at 223.
140. Kristof, supra note 139, at 3.
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C. Religious Minorities Tortured
As some of these stories suggest, many governments that repress religious
minorities through genocide and slavery also torture religious minorities,
thereby violating a third jus cogen. Article 1(1) of the Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Declaration)
defines torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or
confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating him or other persons.
14 1
The Declaration adds that torture "does not include pain or suffering aris-
ing only from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions to the extent
consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners."
142
Communist and theocratic states have violated Article 1(1) of the Tor-
ture Declaration more than any otherjus cogen in connection with religious
oppression. China raided and dosed several hundred house churches
from 1996-98 and detained, interrogated, and beat their members, some of
whom were sent to concentration camps. 14 3 The methods of torture most
commonly reported include electric shock with cattle prods on the face,
arms, and genitals, or through electrified beds; the use of shackles; sleep
deprivation; exposure to extreme temperatures; imposition of unrealistic
production quotas in labor camps; and beatings.144 For example, Chinese
authorities beat the sixty-four year old Auxiliary Bishop of Baoding, Bishop
Su Zhimin, until the board they were using was reduced to splinters, where-
upon the police dismantled a wooden door to continue the beating.' 4 5 On
another occasion, police bound Bishop Su's wrists and suspended him
from the ceiling while beating him so hard that he sustained permanent
hearing loss. 14 6 On still another occasion, Bishop Su was placed in a
closet-sized room with water kept at varying levels, from ankle-deep to hip-
deep, to prevent him from sleeping for several days at a time. 14 7 Likewise,
a Buddhist monk, arrested and imprisoned for three months for distribut-
ing freedom pamphlets and possessing a picture of the Dalai Lama,
reported:
141. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 1.1, G.A. Res. 3452,
U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34 at 90-92, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975) [hereinafter
Torture Declaration]; RESTATEMENT (THIa) OF FOREIGN RELAMONS § 702 cmt. g (1986)
also references this definition.
142. Torture Declaration, supra note 141, art. 1.1.
143. See REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FarEOM, supra note 85.
144. See 1996 AMNEsTY REPORT, supra note 121, at 120; Constructive Engagement,
supra note 12.7, at 18-19.
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The Chinese police tied my hands and suspended me from the ceiling, and
then punched and kicked me, and shocked me all over my body with electric
cattle prods. They shocked me on the genitals so that my genitals bled and
later got infected, and it was difficult to urinate. They also beat me on the
feet with sticks. In the winter, I was made to stand naked against a cold wall
for 3 to 4 hours at a time a few times each week I was also put in solitary
confinement. The Chinese police repeatedly beat me with a stick on my
thigh until the stick broke and splintered into the skin. It got infected and it
took a long time to heal. I wasn't given any medical care for this. One time
when I said Tibet was free, a prison official put a gun to my head and
threatened to kill me. 148
Torture is also a key tool theocratic states use in their efforts to stamp out
apostasy and suppress minority religions. In Pakistan, for example, Chris-
tians have been forced from their villages by Muslim mobs; men beaten,
imprisoned arbitrarily, and tortured to death during "interrogation";
women stripped naked; and girls raped.14 9 In February 1998, police
reportedly led "an attack by several hundred Muslims on a Christian com-
munity in Santinagar, Punjab province, following rumours [sic] that some
Christians had desecrated the Qur'an." °5 0 In Pakistan, Ahmadis, Hindus,
pagans, and minority Muslims also suffer torture, usually by electric
shock, burning, or flogging.' 5 '
Likewise, religious persecution in Saudi Arabia has "increased dramat-
ically" since the Gulf War.' 5 2 Shi'a Muslims, adherents to other minority
Islamic creeds, and Christians have been detained and tortured, using tech-
niques including falaqa (beatings on the soles of the feet), floggings, sus-
pension of the wrists, electric shock, amputations, and inserting rods up
human anuses.1 5 3 Saudi Arabia treats the conversion of Muslims to
another religion as a capital offense' 5 4 and enforces the law strictly
through a special religious police force, the muttawa, which is charged with
ensuring strict conformity with the Shari'a.'
5 5
In 1994, Iranian Christians faced the fiercest persecution since the
Iranian Revolution, especially in the cities of Gurgan and Kermanshah.
Christian pastors, including two successive leaders of the Evangelical
Council of Pastors in Iran, were imprisoned, tortured, and executed on
148. Constructive Engagement, supra note 127, at 19 (statement of Allen Keller, M.D.,
Physicians for Human Rights) (quoting N.R., an eighteen year old Buddhist monk).
149. See id. at 36-39 (statement of Shen Tong, President, Democracy for China Fund);
see also 1996 A mNaSTY REPORT, supra note 121, at 242-43; REPORT ON REIGIOUS FREDOM,
supra note 85.
150. 1998 Am1NE5Ts REPORT, supra 79, at 267.
151. See SHEA, supra note 67, at 37; see also 1996 AmNESTY REPORT, supra note 121, at
242 ("At least 35 Ahmadis were charged with religious offences including blasphemy,
which carries a mandatory death penalty."); REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note
85.
152. SHEA, supra note 67, at 41.
153. See 1996 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 121, at 265-66; 1998 AMN=Sr REPORT,
supra 79, at 295; SHEA, supra note 67, at 41.
154. See SHEA, supra note 67, at 40.
155. See id.
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grounds of "subverting the revolution" and apostasy.15 6 Iranian officials
insist that evangelical Christians "have other agendas besides [sic] wor-
ship. ... We consider them to be a political organization .... If someone
wants to start a political organization they [sic] must go through the pro-
cess to obtain permission, as is the case for Muslims."1 5 7 The Bahai and
Shi'a Muslims in Iran also are subject to various forms of torture, including
electric shock, flogging, and amputation.1
5 8
The Egyptian government also has grown progressively hostile toward
religious minorities as Muslim militants have become more powerful. The
government summarily detains Coptic Christian converts under the Emer-
gency Powers Action of 1982 and tortures them, usually for "denigrating
Islam" or apostasy.15 9 In addition, reports indicate that state security
officers in Cairo have detained, interrogated, and physically abused Chris-
tian converts in an effort to obtain information about the identities and
activities of other converts. 160 The government has reportedly harassed
Coptic Christian families attempting to regain custody of daughters forci-
bly taken from them and required to convert to Islam to marry Muslims.
16 1
The government has detained thousands of suspected members or sympa-
thizers of banned Islamic groups; many have been subjected to systematic
torture, including electric shock, beatings, suspension by the wrists and
ankles, burning with cigarettes, flogging, and psychological torture consist-
ing of death threats and threats of rape or sexual abuse of the detainee or
female relatives.162 In many cases, religious minorities have been "disap-
peared" after reporting to Egyptian detention and interrogation centers.163
Accordingly, the evidence is clear that religious intolerance in Egypt and
elsewhere has led to severe violations of human rights.
II. Linkages Between Fundamental Human Rights and Religious
Liberty
Cross-national research and international law reveal other linkages
between religious liberty and fundamental human rights. As Professor
McDougal has pointed out, "[d]iscrimination based upon religious beliefs
and expression forms the basis for some of the most serious deprivations
of civil and political rights." 164 Indeed, "[i]f not all, the greater part of the
history of humanitarian intervention is the history of intervention on
156. Chris Hedges, Iran Wages Fierce Campaign Against its Christian Minority, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1994, at A5.
157. Id.
158. See 1996 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 121, at 180; 1998 AMNESTY REPORT, supra
79, at 200.
159. See SHEA, supra note 67, at 4445.
160. See REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 85.
161. See id.
162. See 1996 AMNEsTY REPORT, supra note 121, at 141-42; 1998 AMNESTY REPORT,
supra 79, at 158.
163. See 1996 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 121, at 142.
164. McDouGAL ET At., supra note 2, at 653.
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behalf of persecuted religious minorities."165 Nevertheless, the myth sur-
vives, perpetuated by regimes with poor human rights records (and some
legal scholars), that personal liberty can exist without religious tolerance,
free speech without religious speech, freedom of association without free-
dom to worship, women's rights without religious rights, protection for
indigenous persons without religious liberty, and nondiscrimination with-
out freedom from religious discrimination.
A. International Legal Linkages
To the contrary, international law expressly links religious liberty with vir-
tually every major human right, including, inter alia, freedom of associa-
tion,166 freedom of speech, 167 the norm of nondiscrimination, 168 due
165. MANOUCHEHR GA'j, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HumAN RiGHrs 17 (1962)
(footnote omitted). Note also that the protection of minority religious groups under
treaty law long antedates guarantees of religious freedom in national law. See Sidney
Liskofsky, The U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimi-
nation: Historical and Legal Perspectives, in RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
LEO PEFma 453 (ames E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1985).
166. See United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, art. 6, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR,
36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982) [hereinafter Religion Declaration].
Article 6 guarantees freedom to worship or assemble in connection with a religion or
belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes. See also Yoram Dinstein,
Freedom of Religion and the Protection of Religious Minorities, 20 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 155,
168 (1990) (Article 27 of the Religion Declaration "should be viewed as a license for
religious minorities to found and operate the communal institutions required for the
perpetuation of the minority's religion."); id. at 172-73 ("Freedom of assembly and free-
dom of association have a symbiotic relationship with freedom of religion.").
167. See Religion Declaration, supra note 166, art. 6 (guaranteeing freedom to write,
publish and disseminate relevant religious publications, to teach religion, to solicit and
receive financial contributions for religious purposes, and to establish and maintain
communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief at
the national and international levels); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18,
G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess,, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (pro-
viding that "[e]veryone has the right... to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship, and observance"; id. art. 19 (providing that "[elveryone has the right
to freedom of opinion and expression"); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (adding that "[elveryone shall have the right to free-
dom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart informa-
tion and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in
print.... ."); see also Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Report of Angelo Vidal
d'Almeida Ribero, U.N. ESCOR, 43d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/35 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter the Ribero Report] (stating that religious intolerance leads to restrictions on freedom
of opinion and expression); Dinstein, supra note 167, at 171 ("Freedom of expression -
which comprises the right to seek, receive and impart ideas of all kinds - intermingles
with freedom of religion.").
168. See U.N. CI-ARTm art. 1 (providing that one of the four primary purposes of the
U.N. is to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to religion, race, sex, and language); id. art. 2 (enti-
tling everyone to all the rights specified in it "without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political, or other opinion, national or social ori-
gin. .. ."); id. art. 18 (providing that "[elveryone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion.... ."). See also ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 2(1) (providing that
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process,1 69 democracy or the right to free and fair elections, 170 the rights
of indigenous peoples and ethnic groups,1 7 1 the rights of parents and chil-
dren, 172 women's rights,173 the welfare of refugees,17 4 and freedom of edu-
each "State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion.. ."); International Convenant on Ecoomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art.
2(2), G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. NO. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter ICESC] (containing similar language); Religion Declaration, supra
note 167, art. 2(1) ("No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution,
group of persons, or person on grounds of religion or other beliefs"). Also note that the
Religion Declaration and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination were originally integrated as one document, since the aim of both
declarations was the "equality of all men and all peoples without distinction as to race,
color or religion." Natan Lerner, Toward a Draft Declaration Against Religious Intolerance
and Discrimination, 11 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 82, 85 (1982) [hereinafter Lerner, Toward a
Draft Declaration].
169. See Ribero Report, supra note 167, at 23 (breaches of freedom of religion lead to
"arbitrary arrest and detention for reasons of religion.. ").
170. See generally SAMuEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE TiRD WAvE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE
LATE-TwENTim CENURY 72-85 (1991).
171. See ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 27 ("In those States in which ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture,
to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language."). See also Inter-
national Labour Organisation, Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peo-
ples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, art. 5(a), 28 I.L.M. 1382 (providing that
"the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be
recognized and protected"); id. art. 13(1) (likewise providing that "governments shall
respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples con-
cerned of their relationship with the lands or territories"); Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing
the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Reli-
gious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 Am. J. INT'L L. 487, 508 (1988) ("Religion is
often a central component of ethnic group identity. .. ").
172. See Religion Declaration, supra note 166, art. 5 (parents shall "have the right to
organize the life within the family in accordance with their religion or belief" and
"[elvery child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or
belief in accordance with the wishes of his parents.... ."); see also ICCPR, supra note 167,
art. 18(4) (states shall "have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal
guardians, to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity
with their own convictions."); ICESC, supra note 168, art. 13(3) (states shall "have
respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to choose for
their children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which con-
form to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the
State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity
with their own convictions."); United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organ-
isation (UNESCO) Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Dec. 15, 1960, art.
5(1)(b), 93 U.N.T.S. 6193 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention] (similar language).
173. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193,
U.N. Doc. A/34/180 [hereinafter CEDAW]. CEDAW contains a host of provisions that
challenge religious conceptions of the proper role for women in society; for example,
Article 16(1)(b) provides that women shall be entitled to the same extent as men to
"freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full con-
sent." Religiously-inspired contract, property, and marriage and divorce laws may pres-
ent the greatest impediments to equal rights for women. See Sullivan, supra note 171, at
515 ("A major area of conflict between religious law and human rights law is that of
women's rights."); see also Linda Cipriani, Gender and Persecution: Protecting Women
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cation. 175 Case-studies sponsored by the United Nations indicate that
promoting religious toleration promotes each of these human rights.
17 6
The next section of this Article reviews the first cross-national research bol-
stering this conclusion and challenging other alleged explanations for
human rights conduct, such as establishments of religion and type of
religion.
B. Cross-National Human Rights Research
1. Methodology
Credible cross-national research depends upon sound methodology.
Charles Humana's World Human Rights Guide presents a standardized
index of human rights practices in 104 countries, based on the countries'
compliance with forty separate provisions articulated in various U.N.
human rights documents. 17 7 The three most important of these are the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),17 8 the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),17 9 and the International Cove-
Under International Refugee Law, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 511, 511-33 (1993) (discussing the
effect of religion on womens' rights under Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity in a
number of countries); Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamental-
ism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis Under the United Nations
Charter, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271 (1997).
174. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 4, 189
U.N.T.S. 117 ("The Contracting States shall accord to refugees within their territories
treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to their nationals with respect to free-
dom to practise their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their
children."); see also Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28,
1954, art. 4, 360 U.N.T.S. (identical language); McDouGAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 674-
75.
175. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 172, art. 5(1)(b) ("[N]o person or group of
persons should be compelled to receive religious instruction inconsistent with his or
their convictions."); see also ICESC, supra note 168, art. 13(1) (providing that parties
"recognize the right of everyone to education," including education promoting "toler-
ance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups"); Din-
stein, supra note 166, at 163-64, 173-74. See also Minority Schools in Albania, 1935
P.C.IJ. (ser. H/B) No. 64 (Apr. 6) (admonishing Albania that it could not consistently
both guarantee racial, religious, and linguistic minorities an equal right to education,
and abolish sectarian schools, reserving to the State the right to conduct all instruction).
176. See A. KRIsHNAsWAMI, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS AND PRACTICES at v, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/200/Rev. 1 (1960); see also ELIZA-
BETH 0. BENITO, STUDY OF THE CURRENT DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEMS OF INTOLERANCE AND
OF DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF RELIGION OR BELIEF at 8-9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1987/26 (religious intolerance leads to violation of the most basic human rights); Din-
stein, supra note 167, at 170 ("Freedom of religion cannot be separated from other
human rights; its full exercise involves respect for various fundamental freedoms that
may, therefore, be regarded as complementary."); PAT WILLIAMS & TOYIN FALoi.A, REu-
GIOUS IMPACT ON THE NATION STATE 14 (1995) (arguing that "it has always been necessary
to promote religious tolerance in order to prevent conflict in a plural society").
177. For the list of human rights provisions that Humana investigates, see WORLD
HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE, UP-TO-DATE SURVEY OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
RECORDS OF 104 MAJOR COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD xii-xiii (Charles Humana
ed., 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter 1991 GUIDE].
178. See supra note 167.
179. See id.
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nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESP). °80 Humana
consulted Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the U.S. State
Department, as well as various newspapers and other sources, to rate the
human rights practices of States (ranging from strong disrespect to strong
respect for human rights). 18 1 He calculated a final human rights score for
each country after averaging the country's performance over the range of
human rights investigated, then specially weighted some of the human
rights he considered the most important; e.g., those dealing with the right
to life, torture and other cruel or inhuman treatment, compulsory labor,
arbitrary arrest and indefinite detention, and child labor. 8 2
Like all empirical research on human rights, Humana's survey of
human rights practices suffers from certain standard methodological
problems. 8 3 In addition, Humana modified his methodology slightly in
later studies, drawing into question their comparability with earlier
ones.18 4  Nevertheless, the U.N. Development Programme adopted
Humana's human rights index as the basis for its Human Freedom
Index,' s 5 and others have insisted that earlier editions of the World Human
Rights Guide present a useful, cross-national measure of human rights prac-
180. See supra note 168..
181. For a discussion of Humana's general methodology, see 1991 GUIDE, supra note
177, at 5-6.
182. Specifically, Humana calculated the final human rights score for each country
using the following formula: ((nonweighted total) + (total to be weighted) x 100)/162,
where the denominator represents the maximum possible raw score that a country could
receive for compliance with forty selected human rights provisions. See id. at 6.
183. For a discussion of the general methodological problems confronting the mea-
surement of human rights violations, see THOMAS B. JABiNE & RicHARD P. CLAUDE,
HuMAN RIGHTS AND STArisncS: GETING mE REcoRD STRAIGHT (1992).
184. Humana changed his scoring methodology in the late-1980s, i.e., adding
weighted variables, changing some of the questions, and adding some countries. These
changes arguably improved the survey but also drew into question the comparability of
studies that had used the original survey methods. In WORLD HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE
(Charles Humana ed., 1983) [hereinafter 1983 GUIDE], Humana only investigated
human rights practices implicated in the UDHR and ICCPR, as well as a few human
rights issues of personal concern, e.g., the maximum penal consequences for possessing
hard drugs. See id. at 5, 13-23, 34. Humana also investigated a few different countries
in the 1983 GUIDE and 1991 GUIDE. Compare infra Appendix 1 and Appendix 2, (note
that Appendix I includes many more countries than Appendix 2, and that a number of
countries changed cells between Appendix 1 and Appendix 2, because of the 1989
Revolution in Eastern Europe). Although Humana used a four-part ordinal scale in both
the 1991 Guide and 1983 Guide, the meaning of the scales differed. The 1983 Guide
graded answers to human rights inquiries, according to whether the country ranked as
(1) the most free/most liberal; (2) moderately free/moderately liberal; (3) severe/restric-
tive; or (4) the most severe/most restrictive. In contrast, the 1991 Guide's ranking
depended on whether the country (1) strongly disrespected; (2) disrespected; (3)
respected; or (4) strongly respected human rights. Humana also calculated the final
human rights score for each country differently in the 1983 Guide. He totaled scores for
each of his 50 questions without weighting them, giving a "3" for "most free/most lib-
eral," and so on, down to a "0" for "most severe/most restrictive." See 1983 GUIDE, supra,
at 9-10. Unfortunately, Humana has not published a more recent human rights guide
than the 1991 Guide.
185. See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1991,
at 13-21 (1991).
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tices.186 Accordingly, despite its weaknesses, Humana's cross-national sur-
vey of human rights practices is among the best available and is used here
as an indicator of the extent to which individual countries respect human
rights.
Appendices 1 and 2 categorize Humana's human rights scores accord-
ing to the state-religion relationship that countries manifest (y-axis) and
the freedom of religious expression that they tolerate (x-axis). Countries
were categorized into given cells, pursuant to their constitutions (which
illuminate the existence of de jure establishments), survey research, and
scholarly and U.S. government assessments of religious tolerance in indi-
vidual countries.18 7 Categorization necessarily involved a good deal of dis-
cretion, but was as principled and systematic as feasible. Table 1 averages
the human rights scores for countries in each cell of Appendices 1 and 2
and suggests certain tentative conclusions about the association between
variables related to religious liberty and general human rights practices.
Table 1 does not, of course, establish causation between the variables rep-
resented, only association.
Table 1: Typology of State-Religion Relationships
Establishment Limited Expression Free Expression
1991 1983 1991 1983
None (w/indig. relig.) 47.3 56.3 75.5 82.3
None (w/o indig. relig.) n.a. n.a. 90.4 92.7
De Jure 79.5 73.0 94.8 92.0
De Facto 38.5 54.3 75.7 69.2
Both (w/comm. ctrys.) 40.2 43.2 n.a. n.a.
Both (w/o comm. ctrys.) 43.2 53.6 80.5 n.a.
2. Freedom of Expression Contrasted with Establishments of Religion
Table 1 indicates that the best average human rights record (94.8% in
1991) belongs to countries with dejure establishments of religious expres-
sion and free religious expression, e.g., Finland and the United Kingdom.
In these countries, the religious establishment represented "not much more
186. See David L. Banks, Patterns of Oppression: A Statistical Analysis of Human
Rights, Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section of the American Statistical Associa-
tion 154-162 (1985); see also David L. Banks, Patterns of Oppression: An Exploratory
Analysis of Human-Rights Data, 84 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 674 (1989).
187. The relevant U.S. government publications consulted include the following: (1)
U.S. DEP'T STATE, SENATE Comm. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994 (1995); and (2) the Dept. of the Army's Area Handbook
Series, e.g., DEP'T OF THE ARMY, INDIA: A COUNTRY STUDY (1985). The survey research
that I consulted related to church attendance in Western industrialized countries. See
RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SuIFr IN ADvANcED INDUsTRIALzE SocIETIES 200 (1990).
Finally, one example of a scholarly discussion of religious intolerance in individual
countries that I consulted is WILLIAMS & FALOLA, supra note 176.
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than a mere historic relic."18 8 Although recognized by the State, the reli-
gious establishment in those states lacked the widespread adherence and
participation of de facto religious establishments. Countries with no or de
facto establishments of religion had generally worse human rights scores,
whether considered in the context of limited religious expression, e.g., in
Israel, or relatively free religious expression, e.g., in Norway. This proves
true during the time period covered by both the 1983 Guide and 1991
Guide,18 9 suggesting a fairly robust result.
Countries with the poorest average human rights record in 1983 and
1991 included: (1) countries with defacto establishments and limited reli-
gious expression, e.g., the Sudan; and (2) countries with both de facto and
de jure establishments and limited religious expression, e.g., Iran and
China. Overall, within these categories, countries with the least freedom of
religious expression also had the worst human rights records in 1991:
North Korea (20%); Iran (22%), China (21%), Saudi Arabia (29%), Viet-
nam (27%), Iraq (17%), Libya (24%), and Burma (17%). Not incidentally,
both Iran and Saudi Arabia are theocracies. The remaining key offenders
of human rights are primarily communist states, 190 suggesting that reli-
gion is not the cause of human rights tragedies. In fact, when these states
overthrew their de jure/de facto establishments of Marxism following the
collapse of the Eastern block, their human rights scores improved dramati-
cally. For example, between 1983 and 1991, Czechoslovakia's score
increased from 36% to 97%; Romania's from 32% to 82%; Poland's, from
36% to 83%; and Hungary's, from 54% to 97%.
Even more dramatically, a comparison of the free expression and lim-
ited expression columns in Table 1 reveals that the average human rights
records of countries permitting relatively free religious expression was sub-
stantially better than that of countries limiting religious expression. This
remains true regardless of the type of establishment a state possessed in
1983 and 1991. Even countries with de jure/de facto establishments that,
nevertheless, allowed relatively free religious expression had quite respecta-
ble human rights records, e.g., Bolivia (80.5%). This suggests that the poor
human rights records of these regimes has more to do with the inherent
tendency of de jure/de facto regimes to limit religious expression than the
state-religion relationship itself.
188. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 176, at 47. For example, Finland recognizes the
Lutheran Church of Finland and the Orthodox Church of Finland as its two official
churches. Roughly 90% of the Finnish population affiliates with these State churches.
However, surveys show that only 10% of Finns read the Bible weekly, and only 12%
attend church at least once a month. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FINLAND: A CouNRY STUDY
103-04 (1990). See also INGLELART, supra note 187, at 185-211 (discussing seculariza-
tion in advanced industrialized societies).
189. The 1991 Guide covers the period from the late-1980s to November 1991,
whereas the 1983 Guide covers the period from 1982 to April 1983. See 1991 GUIDE,
supra note 177, at xi, xix; 1983 GUIDE, supra note 184, at 5, 29, 34-35. Hereinafter the
text will refer to these periods as "1983" and "1991" to simplify discussion.
190. See id.
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3. Freedom of Expression Contrasted with Type of Religion
Some commentators claim that the type of religion prevalent in a country
is the best predictor of human rights practices. 19 1 According to this the-
ory, certain types of religion are more often associated with human rights
abuses. To examine this argument, we return to Appendices 1 and 2,
which list the dominant religion of each country. 19 2 Table 2 presents the
average human rights score for each major religion listed in Appendices 1
and 2, calculated by totaling their associated country human rights score
and dividing by the number of states having that particular dominant reli-
gion. For example, to calculate the average human rights score for Islam in
1991, the human rights scores for each country that Appendix 1 lists as
predominantly Islamic was totaled and then divided by the number of
Islamic states listed in Appendix 1.
Table 2: Relationship of Religion to Human Rights










The resulting divergence in human rights scores among religions is star-
tling. Table 2 indicates that in 1991 and 1983, Protestantism was associ-
ated with the best record and Marxist-Leninism with the worst. Other
191. See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACnCE 52,
57, 126 (1989) (arguing that, whereas Judeo-Christianity focuses on individual rights,
Islam and most other religions focus on duty); id. at 135 (arguing that Hindus reject the
notion that human life is superior to other types of life because of the doctrine of rein-
carnation and that the Hindu caste system "deems the equal worth of all human
beings"). See also Mansour Farhang, Fundamentalism and Civil Rights in Contemporary
Middle Eastern Politics, in HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE WoRLD's REUGIONS 64 (Leroy S.
Rouner ed., 1988) [hereinafter Rouner] ("In Islam, the rights of individuals constitute
obligations connected with the Divine"); John B. Carman, Duties and Rights in Hindu
Society, in Rouner, supra, at 113-28 (individual rights can be understood only within the
context of duty in Hindu society); Taitetsu Unno, Personal Rights and Contemporary Bud-
dhism, in Rouner, supra, at 129 (Buddhism emphasizes a sense of gratitude rather than
rights); Joshua Mitchell, Protestant Thought and Republican Spirit: How Luther Enchanted
the World, 86 Am. POL. Sci. Rev. 688 (1992) (Protestantism uniquely promoted the idea
of separation of church and state).
192. The same sources that I used to classify countries in Table I provided the basis
for my religious classifications in Appendix 1. See supra note 177 and accompanying
text.
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religions fall between these extremes. Thus, on first glance, Table 2 seems
strongly to support the argument that human rights practices depend pri-
marily on the type of religion a nation practices. However, a closer exami-
nation of Table 2 in relation to the Appendices reveals that this association
may be superficial, resulting from a more rudimentary relationship
between human rights practices and religious tolerance.
Some countries with a dominant religion that Table 2 associates with a
poor human rights score nevertheless possess quite respectable human
rights records, e.g., Islamic Senegal (89% in 1983 and 71% in 1991) and
Guinea (93% in 1983 and 70% in 1991). Both countries practice a moder-
ate form of Islam which permitted relatively free religious expression in the
1980s and 1990s.19 3 Senegalese Islam not only embraced the secular
nation-state, but also the "notion of race enshrined in the cultural philoso-
phy of Negritude," an imperfect democracy, and religious tolerance. 19 4
Consequently, "Senegalese society has never been subjected to the repres-
sion, exploitation, arbitrariness, or, indeed, terror known by all too many
of its neighbors."
195
Secondary analysis also reveals one country with a dominant religion
that Table 2 associates with a good human rights score, nevertheless, pos-
sessing a poor human rights record: Catholic Guatemala (62% in 1991).
Serious infringements of religious liberty in Guatemala coincided with a
period of severe human rights violations in that country. Protestant Gen-
eral Efrain Rios Montt assumed the Presidency of Guatemala in 1982, dur-
ing a period when the Protestant Church was growing rapidly and
Catholic-Protestant tension was severe. 196 The military began a "counter-
insurgency frenzy" in the highlands of Guatemala, targeting Catholic clergy
and catechists as subversives while regarding evangelicals as patriots and
anti-communists. 197 Liberation theology transformed Catholic Action and
Delegates of the Word into strong opponents of the military regime begin-
193. See Leonardo A. Villalon, Islam and the State in West Africa: Disciples and Citi-
zens in Fatick, Senegal 4 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas
(Austin)) ("[T]here is a close link between the role of Islam in [Senegal] and its political
successes."); id. at 428 ("The maraboutic system is thus central to Senegal's relative suc-
cess in maintaining the 'precarious balance' between state and society, and to the conse-
quent avoidance of the unchecked authoritarian excesses that result from a disruption of
this balance."); see also HAROLD D. NELSON Er AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR SENEGAL 125
(1974); HAROLD D. NELSON ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR GUINEA 88, 91-92, 93, 96-98 (2d
ed. 1976) (stating that Islam has been secularized in Guinea).
194. See Villalon, supra note 193, at 2; ("Islam in Senegal has been paradigmatically
'conformist,' capable of accommodating itself to the 'prevailing political reality' of the
modern nation-state") (citing JAMES P. PISCATORI, ISLAM IN A WORLD OF NATION-STATES
(1986)); see also ROBERT FATTON, JR., THE MAKING OF A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: SENEGAL'S
PASSIVE REvOLUTION, 1975-1985 (1987) (arguing that Senegal can make a rare claim in
Africa: it has a functioning democracy).
195. Villalon, supra note 193, at 3; see also SHELDON GELLAR, SENEGAL: AN AFRICAN
NATION BErwEEN ISLAM AND THE WEST 23 (1982).
196. See Edward L. Cleary, Evangelicals and Competition in Gautemala, in CONFICT
AND COMPETITION: THE LATIN AMERICAN CHURCH IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 177-78,
188-90 (Edward L. Cleary & Hannah Stewart-Gambino eds., 1992) [hereinafter CON.
FLICT AND COMPETITION]; see also TOM BARRY, INSIDE GUATEMALA 188, 197 (1992).
197. See BARRY, supra note 196, at 187.
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ning in the mid-1960s.1 98 Naturally, they also become opponents of
evangelicals aligned with the military; Archbishop Prospero Penados del
Barrio asserted that evangelicals "represented an imperialist conspiracy to
assert U.S. economic and political dominance in the region."1 9 9 The mili-
tary assassinated many Catholic clergy and banished others from the coun-
try, many of whom formed an active Guatemalan Church in Exile.
20 0
Many peasants converted to evangelicalism to avoid being identified with
the counterinsurgency. 20 1 Human rights violations during this period
were severe, and did not begin to moderate until Jorge Serrano came to
power in 1991 on a platform de-emphasizing religious identity as a polit-
ical issue. 20 2 By the mid-1990s, tension between Catholics and Protestants
eased, and the Guatemalan Peace Agreements were signed (December 29,
1996).203 Thus, the Appendices, together with Table 2, suggest that reli-
gions normally associated with good human rights records, in this case
both Catholicism and Protestantism, can be associated with poor human
rights records if states prohibit religious dissent.
History also demonstrates that the relationship between religion and
human rights practices has varied over time, depending upon the openness
of spiritual leaders to alternative religious viewpoints. For example, Vati-
can II, which ended centuries of Catholic opposition to religious tolerance
and the separation of church and state, roughly marked the transition of
Latin American countries from military regimes guilty of committing terri-
ble human rights violations, most notably "disappearances," to democra-
cies with respectable human rights records.20 4 Catholicism evolved from a
religion authenticating oligarchy, authoritarianism, and religious intoler-
ance to one opposed to it.
205
Protestantism in the United States, although now associated with reli-
gious tolerance, also historically promoted religious intolerance by sup-
pressing African religion among slaves in the South; inciting mob violence
against Catholics and burning their churches; discriminating against,
expelling, and inciting violence against other minority Protestants; and
driving the Mormons west, confiscating their property, and disenfranchis-
ing and killing them.
20 6
Islam has also wavered in its receptivity to religious minorities. The
modern Islamic fundamentalist movement has been shaped by the Iranian
Revolution, which has proven extremely intolerant of most religious minor-
198. See id. at 190-92
199. Id. at 187, 200-01.
200. See id. at 192.
201. See id. at 198.
202. See id. at 28-29, 32, 187-88.
203. See id. at 188, 193-94; see also U.N. Dept. of Public Information, Guatemalan
Peace Agreements (1998).
204. See infra Part III.B.2; see also HUNTNGTON, THE THIRD WAVE, supra note 171, at
76-85.
205. See HuNTINGTON, supra note 170, at 77.
206. See Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv.
221, 222-23 (1993).
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ities.20 7 The Iranian Revolution brought fundamentalist Shi'as to power,
who began exporting their views and trying to silence alternative Islamic
viewpoints more tolerant of religious minorities.2°0 Before the Revolution,
Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, and Nigeria, among other countries, tolerated
non-Islamic religious expression.20 9 Much earlier, during the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, Calvinists, Montanist Christians, and Jews from Hun-
gary, Transylvania, and elsewhere fled to the Islamic Ottoman Empire to
escape Catholic rule.2 10 The Prophet Mohammed himself promised toler-
ance for Christians2 11 and Jews.2 12 More recently, the average human
rights score for Islam has plummeted as fundamentalists have tried to
silence alternative Muslim and Christian religious viewpoints through gang
violence, rape, torture, vandalism, and arson and by insisting upon capital
punishment for apostasy, conversion, and defiling "the sacred name of the
holy Prophet Mohammed."
2 13
207. See, e.g., DAVID MENASHRI, IRAN: A DECADE OF WAR AND REVOLUTION 3-4 (1990)
(arguing that secularization and westernization caused substantial popular and clerical
resentment, leading to the Iranian Revolution). Following the Revolution, Iran pledged
to assist Muslim revolutions anywhere. See id. at 96-97. See also JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM
AND POLITICS (1984) (discussing Iranian Revolution for export); EMANUEL SIvAN, RADICAL
IsLAm, MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY, AND MODERN' POLITICS (1985); TAREQ Y. ISMAEL & JACQUELINE
S. ISMAEL, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN ISLAM (1985); MOHAMMED AyooB, THE POLITICS OF
ISLAMIC REASSERTION (1981); James C.N. Paul, Islam and the State: The Problems of Estab-
lishing Legitimacy and Human Rights, 12 CARDoZo L. REv. 1057, 1065 (1991) (arguing
that while Iran is a special and extreme case, it is widely thought that the events there
have been influential in inspiring fundamental changes elsewhere.).
208. See Paul, supra note 207, at 1067-68 (discussing three Islamic approaches to the
relationship of religion to the state, only one of which constitutes a theocracy); Abdul-
lahi A. An-Na'im, Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and the Limits of Cultural Relativ-
ism, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 14-18 (1987) (calling for a modern approach to the Shari'a that
protects minority rights).
209. See MENASHRI, supra note 207, at 3 (arguing that the Shah of Iran moved toward
separating state and religion); WILLIAMS & FALOLA, supra note 176, at 19 (arguing that
early Nigerian leaders made a secular state and religious tolerance a primary goal).
210. See MARSHALL, supra note 78, at 17; McDOUGAL Er AL., supra note 2, at 669 (stat-
ing that the Ottoman Empire tolerated religion due to the Treaty of Berlin of 1878);
Stephen Fischer-Galati, Judeo-Christian Aspects of Pax Ottomanica, in TOLERANCE AND
MOVEMENTS OF RELIGIOUS DISSENT IN EASTERN EUROPE (Bela K. Kiraly ed., 1975) (stating
that Christians and Jews enjoyed religious freedom until the end of the sixteenth cen-
tury). See also Rouner, supra note 192, at 6 (separation between religion and the state
existed in the Muslim world for at least eleven of Islam's fourteen centuries).
211. See MONTGOMERY WATT, MUHAMMAD AT MEDINA 359 (1956) (Excursus F, v. 16).
Watt noted that:
The Messenger of God ... wrote to the bishop of B. al-Harith b. Ka'b and the
bishops of Najrin and their priests and those who followed them and their
monks, that for all their churches, services, and monastic practices, few or
many, they had the protection (jiwar) of God and His Messenger. No bishop
will be moved from his episcopate, no monk from his monastic state, no priest
from his priesthood. There will be no alteration of any right or authority or
circumstances, so long as they are loyal and perform their obligations well, they
not being burdened by wrong suffered and not doing wrong.
Id.
212. See id. at 358.
213. SHEA, supra note 67, at 36. See generally Paul Marshall, Tasle - Houses of Worship:
Not Free to Believe, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1999, at W1 1; MARSHALL, supra note 78.
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III. Additional Reasons for Promoting Religious Tolerance
Additional reasons exist for reassessing the treatment of religious minori-
ties under international law. Policies for promoting religious tolerance are
essential for the following "realistic," utilitarian, and philosophical reasons:
(1) to respond to the dangerous multipolar, civilizational politics now driv-
ing international relations; 2 14 (2) to moderate religious absolutism and
ensure normative development; and (3) to enable individuals to be truly
human.
A. Multipolar, Civilizational Politics
In the post-Cold War era, multipolar civilizational politics is rapidly replac-
ing ideological conflict as the dominant organizational principle of interna-
tional relations.2 15 Among diplomats, "[tihe question, 'Which side are you
on?' has been replaced by the much more fundamental one, 'Who are
you?' "216 In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet empire, statesmen
answer these questions by examining their "blood and belief, faith and fam-
ily.",2 17 Of these, faith may be the most important source of national iden-
tity.2 18 Ideologies fade away, empires rise and fall, governments come and
go, but civilizations and the religions upon which they are based remain. It
is not surprising, therefore, that the vacuum left by the end of ideological
conflict is now being filled by civilizational conflict based upon geo-reli-
gious fault lines among Christian, Islamic, Hindu, and Confucian
states. 2 19 The world is no longer primarily East or West and North or
South, but Dar al-Islam or Dar al-Harb.
It is not surprising, therefore, that when the predominately secular
Serb leadership manipulated religion to demonize Bosnians in 1992 (like
the Young Turks demonized Armenians), 220 ancient international align-
ments reemerged. Turkey, Iran, and other Islamic states came to the aid of
Bosnians, whereas Russia backed Orthodox Serbia, and .Germany sup-
ported Catholic Croatia.2 21 Concerning foreign policy in general, former
Soviet republics are realigning along this Orthodox-Islamic axis. Belarus,
Moldova, and the Ukraine are drawing closer to Russia, whereas Uzbeki-
stan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are developing closer
associations among themselves and with their Muslim neighbors, particu-
larly Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.
2 22
214. See generally HUNTINGTON, supra note 12.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 125.
217. Id. at 126.
218. See id. at 42.
219. See id. at 53-54. Note that the only remaining world religion, Buddhism, is not
currently associated with any hegemon. See id. at 47-48.
220. See supra Part I.A.1.
221. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 12, at 127.
222. See id. at 127, 146. In 1996, Turkey's Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was
especially vocal about inaugurating a Turkish-led "global Muslim order." See James M.
Dorsey, Turkish Leader's Islamic Tilt Vexes West; But Erbakan's Rhetoric and Actions Don't
Always Jibe, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 1996, at A6. He insisted the "world has to be reshaped"
and called for the creation of an Islamic military alliance similar to NATO, the introduc-
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Muslims and Christians also confront one another in northern Africa,
where a religious fault line divides the north from the south. We have
already seen how the fundamentalist Islamic government of Sudan, based
primarily in the north, is killing and enslaving Christians in the south.
223
Similar geo-religious conflicts exist in Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya, and Ethio-
pia.224 Religious fault lines also separate Christians and Muslims in the
Philippines; Muslims and Hindu fundamentalists in India; Sinhalese Bud-
dhists and Tamil Hindus in Sri Lanka; Muslims and Christians in Indone-
sia; and Orthodox Russians and fundamentalist Muslims in Tajikistan and
Chechnya. 225
Only religious tolerance, combined with balance of power politics, can
take the wind out of this civilizational confrontation, the surface of which
has only been scratched. The potential for a serious global conflagration
rooted in religious difference re-emerged in the 1990s, and tension and
civil war premised on religious differences became more common. Accord-
ingly, political realists cannot fairly assert that the promotion of religious
tolerance constitutes merely an idealistic crusade. Rather, an international
policy of religious tolerance would, among other things, (1) eliminate a
potential justification for intervention on behalf of co-religionists, (2) mod-
erate fundamentalist and nationalist movements by removing some of the
impetus behind their organization, and (3) stem secessionist movements
based on religious differences. The latter in particular constitute "a stand-
ing challenge to an international order based on the sovereign state."
226
In general, religious tolerance may be essential to ensure the contin-
ued viability of the international rule of law. Modern international law
essentially represents a pragmatic compromise among states concerning
what is useful and (perhaps less frequently) moral; its precepts are contin-
gent, tentative, fluid, and often relative in the same manner as democratic
governance.227 In contrast, theocracies and, to a lesser extent in the
1990s, Marxist-Leninist and Maoist governments advocate manifestos
thought to represent everlasting deontological truth. 228 They believe that
their inspired rules supersede and subordinate all contrary laws.
tion of an Islamic currency, and the establishment of an Islamic United Nations. Id.
Facing stiff opposition from Turkey's military, Erbakan lost power in June 1997, and his
Turkish Islamic Party was banned by Turkey's high court in January 1998. See Turkish
Islamic Party Officially Dissolved, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1998, at A5. However, the party is
reforming with significant popular support as the Party of Virtue. See Stephen Kinzer,
Under Close Scrutiny, Turkey's Pro-Islam Party Has a Makeover, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
1998, at A7.
223. See supra Parts I.A.3. and I.B.1.
224. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 12, at 137.
225. See id. at 127, 138.
226. JAMES MAYALL, NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL SocIETY 63 (1990).
227. See Hans Kelsen, Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics, in MODERN
POLITCAL THOUGHT- THE GREAT IssuES 25, 27-28 (William Ebenstein ed., 2d ed. 1960);
ROBERT DAHL, WHO GoVERNs?: DEmocRAcY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY 312-25
(1961) CHARLEs E. LINDBLOM, INQUIRY AND CHANGE: THE TROUBLED ATrEMPT TO UNDER-
sTAND AN SHAPE SOcIETY 67 (1990).
228. See McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 79.
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Accordingly, Hans Kelsen wrote, "[t]olerance, minority rights, freedom
of speech, and freedom of thought, so characteristic of democracy, have no
place within a political system based on the belief in absolute values."
229
When international law contradicts the communist manifesto or divine
law, the international rule of law will generally lose and every imaginable
violation thereof - including what the West deems terrorism - will be
considered justifiable.230 International law and religious absolutism thus
are ultimately incompatible in a system of nation-states that do not adhere
to the same set of absolutist values. On the other hand, religious tolerance
promotes respect for international law and the ideals of compromise and
diversity.
B. Religious Absolutism and Normative Stagnation
Religious tolerance also undermines religious absolutism. As Mill put it,
"[rleligious belief is the weapon to destroy religious belief: new and purer
forms of belief destroy the corrupt and historical forms." 23 1 This is not to
suggest that religious truth itself is relative,232 but rather that human inter-
pretation of truth, religious or otherwise, is fallible, and the marketplace of
ideas often provides the best antidote to errant doctrine. 233 For example,
alternate Christian viewpoints on slavery collided in the 1800s, and ulti-
mately led to total victory of abolitionist thought.2 34 Likewise, intra-Catho-
lic and Catholic-Protestant debates ultimately led to a shift in the Catholic
Church's view of democracy and human rights in the 1960s. 2 35 Indeed, a
longer view of history suggests that revolutions in world history have
always been preceded by religious ferment.236
Observing relationships like these, Mill reached the controversial con-
clusion that "Itihe moral progress of man has depended on the progress of
moral opinion, but... shifts in that opinion have required prior shifts in
the 'truths' of religion."237 Mill has been attacked by both atheists and
theists on account of this claim. Atheists reject the notion that moral pro-
gress depends on religion, whereas many theists deny that normative pro-
229. Id. at 27.
230. See Kelsen, supra note 227, at 25 (an absolutist position is that the state should
be the sole legal authority, "the god in the world of law"); see also McDoUGAL ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 654-56; Dinstein, supra note 166, at 166; Lerner, Toward a Draft Declara-
tion, supra note 168, at 82, 83.
231. ELDON J. EISENACH, Two WORLDS OF LIBERALiSM: RELIGION AND POLITCS IN HOB-
BES, LOCKE, AND MILL 172 (1981).
232. SeeJohn S. Mill, Utility of Religion, in 10 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL:
ESSAYS ON ETHICS, RELIGION AND SocIErY 415 QJ.M. Robson ed., 1969) (admitting that
utilitarianism cannot teach morality and arguing that "religion alone can teach us what
morality is").
233. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS 574 (William
Ebenstein ed., 3d ed. 1960) ("Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opin-
ion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of
action.").
234. See infra Part II.B.1
235. See infra Part II.B.2.
236. See infra Part III.B.3.
237. EISENACH, supra note 231, at 172.
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gress occurs. Of course, one need not agree that man's inner moral
condition can improve to agree with Mill that at least superficial normative
progress occurs. We need only to accept that certain norms of behavior
become more fashionable in some periods for non-altruistic reasons; e.g.,
as a result of bandwagoning. Some contend, for example, that the United
States did not reject slavery until it became socially unacceptable and less
profitable. 238 If this is true, a type of moral progress occurred in the
United States without necessarily any net improvement occurring in the
moral condition of Americans.
1. American Slavery
Although it is hard to believe now, many American Christians once justi-
fied slavery, because they believed God ordained it to evangelize hea-
thens.239 Support for slavery varied by Christian denomination and
within denominations over time. In the quarter century following 1745,
Presbyterians and Episcopalians, who disproportionately included the
Southern white elite, led the "mission to the slaves" movement.240 Many of
these Christians believed that the institution of slavery was itself neutral,
but that slaveholders were responsible for Christianizing their slaves. 241 In
contrast, Methodists and Baptists, who included in their congregations
during this period primarily lower income whites and slaves, strongly criti-
cized slavery.242 Unfortunately, in the 1830s, this anti-slavery message
was silenced (at least in the South) when Baptist churches began to attract
more influential slaveholders, and Methodists came to believe that their
continued growth hinged on ceasing their efforts to prohibit slaveown-
ing.243 Gradually, a serious schism arose in these denominations over
slavery, leading them to split bitterly into northern and southern branches
in the 1840s.2
44
The only Protestant Christians to remain steadfastly anti-slavery were
Quakers and Freewill Baptists, who refused even to allow slaveholders into
their midst. Catholics, Episcopalians, and Lutherans developed a disincli-
nation even to admit that slavery was a valid subject for discussion. 245 The
last of the major Protestant denominations to split over slavery were the
Presbyterians in 1861, the Episcopalians in 1862, and the Lutherans in
238. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY: STUDIES IN THE
ECONOMY AND SoCIETrY OF THE SLAVE SoUTH 43, 157 (1965);James Lee Ray, The Abolition
of Slavery and the End of International War, 43 INT'L ORG. 405-06 (1989).
239. John B. Boles, Introduction, in MASTERS & SLAVES IN THE HOUSE OF THE LORD:
RACE AND RELIGION IN THE AMERICAN SoUTm 1740-1870, at 7, 11 (John B. Boles ed., 1988).
240. Id. at 8.
241. See JOHN R. McKIVIGAN, THE WAR AGAINST PROSLAVERY RELIGION: ABOLITIONISM
AND THE NORTHERN CHURCHES 1830-1865, at 32 (1984).
242. See Boles, supra note 239, at 8.
243. See McKmGAN, supra note 241, at 26.
244. See E. MERTON COULTER, THE CONEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 1861-1865, at 521,
524-25, 7 A HISTORY OF THE SOUTH (Wendell Holmes Stephenson & E. Merton Coulter
eds., 1950).
245. See McKIVIGAN, supra note 241, at 27-28; COULTER, supra note 244, at 521-22.
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1863.246 Congregationalists and Unitarians, who never developed a strong
presence in the South, nevertheless established fraternal correspondence
with slaveowners and tended to favor African re-colonization schemes
rather than emancipation. 24 7
Pro-slavery Christians asserted that they were Biblical literalists and
fundamentalists.2 48 They preached that blacks were the Biblical descend-
ants of Ham or Cain, heirs to curses of perpetual subjugation.24 9 Ameri-
can slavery was consistent, they said, with the slavery of the patriarchs in
the Old Testament. Furthermore, pro-slavery Christians claimed that
neither Jesus Christ nor His apostles condemned slavery, even though it
was practiced during their time.25 0 Finally, they pointed out that Saint
Paul admonished slaves in several epistles to be obedient to their earthly
masters and even ordered an escaped slave, Onesimus, to return to his
master, Philemon.25 1 In contrast, abolitionists insisted that Christians
must examine the Bible in its totality, stressing its overriding emphasis on
the inherent dignity of human beings and on the principles of justice and
righteousness - ideas they claimed were entirely at odds with the institu-
tion of slavery.252 Abolitionists also rejected the claims that African-Ameri-
cans were heirs of Cain or Ham and tried to prove that American slavery
was harsher than the slavery of the Old Testament Jews.
253
The conflict between these two viewpoints came to a head during the
Civil War, and was not resolved in favor of abolitionist theology until a
considerable time after the North's triumph. African-Americans did not
receive formal apologies from many established Southern denominations
(e.g., the Southern Baptists) for their pro-slavery gospel and, in many cases,
active resistance to the anti-discrimination movements of the 1960s, until
as late as the 1990s.254 Ultimately, however, the conflict of abolitionist
and pro-slavery theologies made possible by the religious liberty our gov-
ernment affords was resolved in favor of human rights.
2. Vatican II and the Third Wave of Democratization
Another example of profound theological transformation leading to human
rights progress occurred following the adoption of Vatican II in 1965.255
Before 1965, the Catholic Church officially opposed democracy and sepa-
246. See COULTER, supra note 244, at 523-24. Episcopalians split not because of theo-
logical differences, but to make administration of the church more expedient.
247. See MCKIVIGAN, supra note 241, at 26-27.




252. See id. at 31; see also Boles, supra note 239, at 14.
253. See McKrviGAN, supra note 241, at 30.
254. See Carl Rowan, Courageous Southern Baptists Deserve Blessing of America, CHI.
SuN-TiMES, June 23, 1995, at 31; see also Baptists' Apology Helps Old Racial Wounds Heal,
ATLANrAJ. & CoNsT., June 22, 1995, at A10; Deborah Mathis, Baptists' Apology is Just a
Start, DALLAS MORNING NEws, June 25, 1995, at J7.
255. See PHILLIP BERmIYr i THE RELIGIOUS RooTs oF REBELLION: CHRIS-TAs IN CENTRAL
AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS 26 (1984) ("The greatest event in twentieth-century church his-
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ration of church and state, arguing that the state should support the
church and that democracy was synonymous with anti-clericalism and
moral decadence.256 Vatican II endorsed the view that human rights and
individual liberties, including religious liberty, derive from natural law.
25 7
In addition, Vatican II stressed the legitimacy and need for social change;
emphasized the contingent character of social and political structures;
urged collegial action by bishops, priests, and laity; and advocated democ-
racy and the separation of church and state.
258
Vatican II had a radical effect on the Catholic Church and world poli-
tics. The Catholic Church metamorphosed from a pillar of authoritarian
rule to a powerful opponent of political absolutism. 2 59 Following the Latin
American bishops' conference in Medellin in 1968, liberation theology
motivated Catholics in Latin America to create base communities, the even-
tual center of political opposition to established regimes. 260 Papal visits
and outspoken bishops in Brazil, El Salvador, South Korea and Poland
mobilized powerful resistance to authoritarian leaders.261 In Central
tory was the Second Vatican Council"; Vatican II was "comparable only to the Protestant
Reformation and in a number of ways [was] analogous to it.").
256. See J. Bryan Hehir, Catholicism and Democracy: Conflict, Change and Collabora-
tion, in CHRISTIANITY AND DamocRAcY IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 15-23 (John Witte, Jr. ed.,
1993) [hereinafter CHISTIANITY AND D~mocRAcY]. Prior to the 1970s, many scholars
argued that Catholic countries could not support democracy and rapid economic
growth. See Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, in GREAT POLITICAL
THINKERS, supra note 233, at 437 (stating that northern Europeans enjoy liberty and
independence because the embraced Protestantism, whereas southern Europeans do not
enjoy this freedom because they embraced Catholicism); NIEBUHR, supra note 1, at 128
(arguing that Catholicism "is in basic conflict with a democratic society"); see generally
MAx WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1947) (discussing
Weber's Protestant Thesis, i.e., that Protestantism encourages economic enterprise, the
development of the bourgeoisie, capitalism, economic wealth, and democracy).
257. See The Declaration on Religious Liberty (Dignitatis humanae), in VATICAN COUN-
CIL II: THE CONCILIAR AND POsT-CONCILiAR DOcUMENTs 800 (Austin Flannery ed., 1992)
and The Patoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et spes), in
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 166 (David J. O'Brien &
Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992). See also John Witte, Jr., Introduction, in CHRISTIANITY
AND DEMocRACY, supra note 258, at 10; McDouGAL Er AL., supra note 2, at 685; Jose
COMBLIN, THE CHURCH AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 41-43 (1979). For a discussion
of post-Vatican II Catholic theology on human rights, see douard Hamel, SJ., The Foun-
dations of Human Rights in Biblical Theology Following the Orientations of Gaudium et
spes, in VATICAN II: ASSESSMENT AND PERSPECTIVES 460 (RenE Latourelle ed., 2d ed. 1989);
Luis Ladaria, SJ., Humanity in the Light of Christ in the Second Vatican Council, id. at 386.
258. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 170, at 78; see also Witte, supra note 256, at 10-11;
JAMES DUNIERLEY, THE LONG WAR: DICTATORSHIP AND REVOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR 77-78
(1982); HECTOR PEREz-BRIGNOI, A BRIEF HISTORY OF CENTRAL AMERICA 144-46, 151
(1989).
259. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 170, at 76-85.
260. See BERRYMAN, supra note 255, at 7, 22-23, 28-32, 79-89, 105-111; GEORGE C.
LODGE, ENGINES OF CHANGE: UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA
188-238 (1970); HUNINGTON, supra note 170, at 76-85; see generally PAULO FREIRE,
PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970).
261. See BERYMAN, supra note 255, at 7, 150-51, 343; Hehir, supra note 256, at 29.
See also TIMOTHY G. ASH, THE USES OF ADVERSITY: ESSAYS ON THE FATE OF CENTRAL EUROPE
58-60 (1990) (discussing the critical role of Papal visits to the Polish Revolution).
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America, church pronouncements and leadership fueled revolution. 262
Overall, Vatican II contributed to a "third wave" of democratization in
the Second and Third World in countries where Catholicism was predomi-
nant, virtually ending disappearances, torture, repression of speech and
association, and other human rights violations that communists and mili-
tary juntas perpetrated. 263 Moreover, the reason for the theological shift
outlined in Vatican II, according to some scholars, is the theological pres-
sure applied by American and European Catholics and Protestants.
264
Thus, Vatican 11 underscores that the confrontation between religious view-
points undermines aberrant theology and promotes human rights.
3. Key Revolutions in World History
A longer view of history suggests that whenever a supra-national religious
body, state, or empire has brooked no religious dissent, absolutism has
prevailed and progress in human affairs has proved the exception. In con-
trast, radical shifts in the religious belief-systems of lay people from Cathol-
icism to Protestantism to Deism to the secular religion of Marxist-Leninism
led to the most important religious and political revolutions in world his-
tory: the German Lutheran Reformation of 1517, the English Puritan
Revolution of 1640, the American Revolution of 1776, the French Revolu-
tion of 1789, and the Russian Revolution of 1917.265 Each revolution
brought forth a new legal order, announced a new apocalyptic vision of the
perfect end-times, and offered a new eschatology. 266 With the exception of
the French and Russian Revolutions, which punished religious expression,
each revolution also unambiguously advanced human rights.
267
262. See BERYmAN, supra note 255, at 79-89; 105-11, 117-58, 182-219, 343.
263. See Hehir, supra note 256, at 21-26; see also Edward L. Cleary, Conclusion: Poli-
tics and Religion- Crisis, Constraints, and Restructuring, in CONFLICT AND COMPETITION,
supra note 196. Roman Catholicism constitutes the predominant religion in twenty-four
of the thirty-two new democracies established since 1973.
264. See Hehir, supra note 256, at 25, 27-28; see also COMBLIN, supra note 257, at 38-
40; George Weigel, Catholicism and Democracy: The Other Twentieth-Century Revolution,
in THE NEv DEMocRAcIEs: GLOBAL CHANGE AND U.S. POLICY 20-23 (Brad Roberts ed.,
1990); Edward L. Cleary, Conclusion, in CoNFLIcr AND COMPETITION, supra note 196, at
203-04.
265. See John Witte, Jr., A New Concordance of Discordant Canons: Harold J. Berman
on Law and Religion, 42 EMORY LJ. 523, 534 (1993); see also HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH
AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 83-139 (1993); see generally HAR-
OLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REvoLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WEsTEm, LEGAL TRADITION
(1983).
266. See Witte, supra note 265, at 534.
267. See RICHARD PIPEs, THE RussIAN REVOLUTION 838 (1990) ("All on can say with any
assurance is that... Lenin's terror claimed tens if not hundreds of thousands of lives.
Victims of the next wave of terror, launched by Stalin and Hitler, would be counted in
the millions."); Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Misconceptions About Russia Are a Threat to
America, 58 FOR. AFFrRS 797, 803 (1980) (stating that communist apparatus eventually
ground up some 60 million victims). Even the French Revolution, which inspired the
Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789 and, according to some, ushered in human
rights based on republicanism, the Enlightenment, and nationalism, led to the Septem-
ber massacres and Napoleonic Wars. See R.R. PALMER, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD
355-63 (1963); see also PiPEs, supra; see generally Timothy O'Hagan, Liberal Critics of the
French Revolution, in REVOLUTION ANM ENLIGHTENMENT IN EUROPE (Timothy O'Hagan ed.,
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4. Syncretic Religions
Notwithstanding this evidence supporting Mill's theory that religious toler-
ance undermines religious absolutism and leads to normative progress, 2 68
one caveat deserves exploration. Some religions do not so much collide
with other religions as merge with them. Anthropologists refer to this phe-
nomenon as syncretism. 2 69 Syncretic religions fuse different forms of faith
and worship by selectively absorbing the tenets, customs, and rites of alien
religions. 2 70 Generally, syncretic religions result from a polytheistic reli-
gion embracing elements of another polytheistic or monotheistic reli-
gion.2 71 They also tend to be associated with politically absolutist
societies and fatalism. 27 2 Appendix 1 indicates a few states that (1) permit
free religious expression, but (2) manifest poor human rights scores, and
(3) have a dominant religion generally associated with poor human rights
scores. In other words, in at least some instances, states tolerant of reli-
gious expression, but with dominant religions normally associated with
poor human rights records, in fact have poor human rights records.
In these countries either the dominant religion is indigenous, e.g.,
1991). Historians estimate that the Jacobin "Reign of Terror" cost 40,000 Frenchmen
their lives. The Russian campaign of the Napoleonic Wars (which lasted from 1792 to
1815), alone caused the death of 400,000 Frenchmen, not to mention thousands of Rus-
sian casualties. See PALMER, supra note 254, at 359-60, 410.
268. See supra notes 231, 233, 237 and accompanying text.
269. See HOMER G. BARNETT, INNOVATION: THE BASIS OF CULTURAL CHANGE 49 (1953)
(subdividing the process of cultural acceptance into imitation, wherein the purpose of
the acceptor nation or other unit is to produce a copy of some alien cultural pursuit, and
syncretism, wherein the acceptor nation or other unit attempts a compromise between
the alien religion and one of its own cultural elements); see also WILLIAM MADSEN,
CHRISTO-PAGANISM: A STUDY OF MEicAN RELIGIOUS SYNCRETISM 111 (1957); BASIL C. HED-
RICK, RELIGIOUS SYNCRETISM IN SPANISH AMERIC 1 (1967); NGwABI BHEBE, CHRISTIANITY
AND TRADITIONAL RELIGION IN WESTERN ZIMBABWE 1859-1923, at xii (1979).
270. See HEDRICK, supra note 269, at 1.
271. See, e.g., MADSEN, supra note 269, at 172 (stating that Aztec pantheism embraced
Christianity); see also DONALD E. THOMPSON, MAYA PAGANISM AND CHRISTIANITY: A HiS-
TORY OF THE FUSION OF Two RELIGIONS 31 (1954) (stating that Mayan pantheism
embraced Christianity); BHEBE, supra note 271, at xii, 160 (discussing the fusion of
native polytheistic religions with each other and with Christianity); see generally HARvEY
WHITEOUSE, INSIDE THE CULT: RELIGIOUS INNOVATION AND TRANSMISSION IN PAPUA NEw
GUINEA (1995); PETER LAWRENCE, THE GARIA: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF A TRADITIONAL CosMic
SYSTEM IN PAPUA NEw GUINEA (1984).
272. See TALcO-r PARSONS, THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETIES 35 (1977) (In traditional soci-
eties "the statuses of sacred object and secular social unit have not been differentiated");
DEPT. OF THE ARMY, NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 122 (1992) ("In everyday life, [adherents
of indigenous religions blame] misfortune, sickness, political rivalries, inheritance dis-
putes, and even marital choices or the clearing of a new field . . . [on] this religious
framework"); WILLIAMS & FALOLA, supra note 176, at 15 (the Ogboni believe the gods
cause any misfortune that befalls them); MADSEN, supra note 269, at 174 (arguing that
fatalism dominates the Aztec religion); LAWRENCE, supra note 271, at 129, 193-94, 201-
03 (the Garia in Papua New Guinea believe superhuman forces manipulate them for
good or ill); Jacob K. Olupona, Contemporary Religious Terrain, in RELIGION AND SOCIETY
IN NIGERIA 32-33, 68-79 (Jacob K. Olupona & Toyin Falola eds., 1991) (Africans honor
the king next to the gods, and believe that the king communes with the gods sometimes
through sorcery).
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Uganda, or the state has a large indigenous population, e.g., Peru.2 73
Thus, the character of indigenous religions may, indeed, have independent
importance for predicting the human rights record of countries,274 but for
reasons entirely in keeping with the.hypothesis of this Article, i.e., that free
religious expression is the variable most closely associated with respecta-
ble human rights practices. Religions which absorb and merge with other
religions (rather than challenging them with claims of exclusive truth) do
not add to the marketplace of ideas wherein errant doctrine can be tested
and rejected. Religious belief cannot unseat religious belief. Rather, even
when people are permitted to practice religion freely, progress in human
rights cannot occur because the reigning dogma persists. Therefore, free-
dom of religious expression is immaterial and political absolutism
becomes the norm.
C. Impaired Weltanschauungs
Religious tolerance also enables individuals to enjoy a constitutive element
of their personhood, the ability to choose a fundamental orientation
toward the world, or a weftanschauung. Weltanschauungs enable humans to
structure and adapt their relationship to others and to the cosmos; they
provide the lenses through which each individual consciously or uncon-
sciously interprets reality.275 Attitudes toward religion and atheism funda-
mentally shape weltanschauungs,276 because they represent the ultimate
basis for the metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and anthropological
views of an individual. According to John Stuart Mill, individuals deprived
of the opportunity to choose these foundational beliefs suffer stunted
moral and intellectual development.277 Accordingly, "[iln a community
genuinely committed to the goal of human dignity, one paramount policy
273. One can argue that states in which a majority of the populace adheres to indige-
nous religions have established a de facto indigenous religion. However, treating various
indigenous religions differently respects their wide variety more fully. Thus, I do not
classify any indigenous religion as established in a country where a wide variety of
indigenous religions coexist and no recent census data shows that one indigenous reli-
gion has a clear majority over another.
274. Overall, countries with indigenous religions drop the average human rights score
of the "free expression/no establishment" cell of Table 1 in Part II.B.2 from 90.4% to
75.5% in 1991 and from 92.7% to 82.33% in 1983.
275. See RONALD H. NASH, FAri-i & REASON: SEARCHING FOR A RATIONAL FArTm 21, 24
(1988) ("A world-view is a conceptual scheme by which we consciously or uncon-
sciously place or fit everything we believe and by which we interpret and judge reality.").
276. In fact, philosophers refer to attitudes toward religion and atheism as founda-
tional noetic structures. The word "noetic" comes from the Greek verb "noeo," which
means "to understand" or "to think." Thus, a noetic structure stands for the "sum total
of everything that a person believes." See id. at 21-22. See also ROBERT N. BELLAH,
BEYOND BELIEF (1970) (Religion is "a set of symbolic forms and acts that relate man to
the ultimate conditions of his existence").
277. John Stuart Mill wrote:
It is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most by the ban .... The
greatest harm is done to those who are not heretics and whose whole mental
development is cramped and their reason cowed by the fear of heresy. No man
can be a great thinker who does not recognize that as a thinker it is his first duty
to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead.
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should be to honor and defend the freedom of the individual to choose a
fundamental orientation toward the world."
278
Those who would deny to individuals the right to choose a weltan-
schauung commonly assert the same justifications as regimes that violate
human rights: they contend that community cohesion and unity requires
it.2 79 Even some American legal scholars argue that the public square
should be informed only by secular weltanschauungs in most circum-
stances.280 However, underlying such claims "is an assumption that is
essentially contrary to respect for human dignity-an assumption that
implies a profound distrust of the wisdom of allowing individuals to take
the responsibility for their own beliefs." 281 It is, in the words of Professor
Douglas Laycock, "viewpoint discrimination, plain and simple," and a
method of silencing "an important source of viewpoints in the process of
democratic self-government"-viewpoints which in the United States led to,
among other things, abolition, civil rights, the Social Gospel movement,
Prohibition, most historic peace movements, and freer immigration of
refugees. 28
2
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in GREAT POLITICAL THINKERs: PLATO TO THE PRESENT, supra
note 233, at 580-81. See also Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17
(1993) (the "religious dimension" of freedom of expression constitutes "one of the most
vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life,
but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned.").
278. McDoUGAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 661, 698.
279. See id. at 663.
280. See generally BRUCE AcmnuAN, SOCIALJUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) (argu-
ing that political arguments may not presuppose any theory of the good or claim to give
any privileged answers); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Liberty and Democratic Politics, 23 N.
Ky. L. REv. 629, 644 ("[Piublic officials should be hesitant to rely on their religious
convictions. Private citizens should feel much freer to do so."); KENT GREENAWALT, RELI-
GIOUS CONVICTIONs AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1988) (arguing that officials and citizens should
not prohibit certain acts and practices simply because they believe them to be sinful, and
contending that public discourse should be primarily nonreligious, except where ordi-
nary secular morality is inconclusive; then, persons with certain religious convictions
may appropriately rely on beliefs which go beyond publicly accessible reasons);
MIcHAEL J. PERRY, LovE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALTY IN AMERICAN
POLTCS (1991) (arguing that political arguments should be excluded if they claim infal-
libility or if they are inaccessible to others, and that sectarian religious argument tends
to fall in these categories); Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice: Fur-
ther Thoughts - and Second Thoughts - on Love and Power, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 703
(1993) (modifying earlier positions and appearing to argue that religious arguments are
fully admissible in political debate and may be the basis of political decisions); Michael
J. Perry, Religion in Politics, 29 U. CAL. DAvis L. Rev. 729, 738 (1996) (modifying posi-
tion and arguing that religious arguments cannot be the basis of coercive regulation
unless supported by at least one secular argument, except that the argument that all
humans are sacred is always admissible); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 222 (1992) (arguing that the Constitution requires
the "banishment of religion from the public square").
281. McDouGAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 663.
282. Douglas L. Laycock, Freedom of Speech That Is Both Religious and Political, 29
U.C. DAviS L. Rev. 793, 798-99 (1996).
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IV. International Law on Religious Liberty
To date, the United Nations and regional or quasi-regional governmental
bodies with the exception of the European Union and the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have passed human rights
instruments essentially irrelevant for ensuring that religious expression
remains a part of the public square. This section reviews each of the con-
ventions and declarations passed by the United Nations and regional orga-
nizations in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East that
purportedly guarantee some aspect of religious liberty. The section con-
cludes that real advances in international religious liberty will require
another approach.
A. United Nations Conventions and Declarations
United Nations instruments addressing religious liberty distinguish
between three types of religious liberty: (1) freedom of thought and con-
science, (2) freedom of expression, and (3) freedom from discrimination.
International law purports to protect freedom of thought and conscience.
absolutely and the remaining freedoms to a lesser extent; however, "limita-
tions clauses," so named because they limit the international guarantees to
which they apply, essentially swallow the free expression and non-discrimi-
nation rules.283 International law may be interpreted even to derogate
from the right to change one's religious belief. 28
4
1. Freedom of Thought and Conscience
The UDHR, 2 35 ICCPR,28 6 and the Religion Declaration 2 7 purport to
"guarantee the world's citizens the right to freedom of thought and con-
science."288 This right is allegedly sacrosanct and not subject to limita-
tion,289 although we shall see in the next section that it has actually been
restricted under international law.290 Freedom of thought and conscience
is also the least meaningful aspect of religious liberty for two primary rea-
sons. First, and perhaps too obviously, no government can prevent indi-
viduals from believing what they will. Even the most committed fascist,
283. See infra Part IV.A.1-3.
284. See infra Part IV.A.2.
285. See supra note 167.
286. See supra note 167.
287. See supra note 166.
288. See Religion Declaration, supra note 166, art. 1; UDHR, supra note 167, art. 18;
ICCPP, supra note 167, art. 18. Article 19(1) of the ICCPR adds that "[e]veryone shall
have the right to hold opinions without interference." Id. The Religion Declaration's
reference to "whatever belief" in Article 1 and the alteration of its original title ("Declara-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance") was largely in response to
communist objections to the draft document, i.e., the failure of the original draft to
extend the principle of tolerance to "atheistic beliefs." See Lerner, Toward a Draft Decla-
ration, supra note 168; Natan Lerner, The Final Text of the U.N. Declaration Against Intol-
erance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 12 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 185 (1982)
[hereinafter Lerner, Final Text].
289. See ROBERTSON, supra note 94, at 178.
290. See infra Part IV.A.2.
Cornell International Law Journal
communist, and monarchical regimes have discovered that, although they
destroy temples, outlaw religious belief, imprison and torture believers, and
indoctrinate anti-religious views, religious belief and religious thought
persists.
Second, every major theistic and atheistic religion demands that its
adherents practice their beliefs rather than simply meditate upon them as a
fundamental part of their religiosity.2 9 1 Religious doctrines dictate stan-
dards of social conduct and ideals of right and wrong that necessarily
impinge on social, political, and economic activities.292 In the words of
James D. Hunter:
[F]aiths lay out the moral significance of different social institutions and
institutional arrangements. They set forth the social and moral meaning of
marriage and the family, the needs and objectives of education, the princi-
ples of law, the role of government, and so on, and the interrelationships of
these institutions.... Faith and culture, then are inextricably linked. By
elucidating a broader cosmology or world view, faiths not only link the sym-
bols of public culture with the symbols of private culture; they also infuse
the symbols of each sphere with universal if not transcendent signifi-
cance.... And despite the constraints modern societies have placed upon
more traditional religious authority to remain sequestered in the private
sphere, the impulse to synthesize and universalize public and private experi-
ence remains one of the central and unchanging features of religion in the
modern world.
293
Separating religion from politics, economics, and culture strikes most the-
istic and atheistic believers, even in the West, as nonsensical. Indeed, this
Article contends that it is ultimately impossible to enforce such a separa-
tion without limiting human rights in all of these spheres.2 94 Limitations
of religious expression are inevitably associated with limitations on polit-
ical, economic, and cultural human rights.
29 5
2. Freedom to Manifest Belief in Religion
Freedom of expression is the most critical aspect of religious liberty. Limi-
tations on free expression entail much more than preventing religious per-
sons from practicing their beliefs in public. Without freedom to manifest
belief, religious persons cannot assemble together for worship, disciple one
another, educate their children in a manner consistent with their religion,
disseminate and perpetuate doctrine, solicit and receive contributions,
train and appoint religious leaders, communicate with co-religionists at the
national and international level, or proselytize. Fortunately, the Religion
Declaration recognizes the importance of each of these forms of free
291. See generally Rouner, supra note 191.
292. SeeJAEs D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 59 86-87
(1991); see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 35 (1993) ("Religions are
in effect independent centers of power, with bona fide claims on the allegiance of their
members, claims that exist alongside, are not identical to, and will sometimes trump the
claims to obedience that the state makes.").
293. HUNTER, supra note 292, at 58.
294. See supra Part I.B.
295. See supra notes 166-75 and accompanying text.
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expression, except proselytization, by itemizing them as protected religious
liberties.2
96
The UDHR does not enumerate protected forms of religious expres-
sion, but is thought to guarantee the right to proselytize. It states generally
that everyone shall have "the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion," including the "freedom to change his religion or belief, and free-
dom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and obser-
vance." 297 The ICCPR is similar, except for a minor, albeit substantive
change in phraseology. The ICCPR provides that "[e]veryone shall have
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion," including "free-
dom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom,
either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and
teaching."29
8
Arab countries forced the sponsors of the ICCPR to settle on the lesser
"have or adopt" language of Article 18(1) to undermine the liberty to pros-
elytize implied in the UDHR.299 Arab countries tried to insert similar lan-
guage in the UDHR in the late-1940s, but were soundly defeated in that
debate.300 Thereafter, the power of the non-aligned Arab movement
grew.30 1 It proved sufficient to block any reference to the right to prosely-
tize in the Religion Declaration, supposedly the most comprehensive inter-
national instrument for the protection of religious liberty. 30 2 Accordingly,
the status of the liberty to change one's belief has substantially deterio-
rated in the 1990s, even though it appears to be a natural corollary of the
Religion Declaration's guarantee that "no one shall be subject to coer-
cion"30 3 and international law's purported absolute guarantee of freedom
of thought and conscience.
30 4
Limitations clauses have also largely swallowed the remaining guaran-
tees of religious liberty in international human rights instruments. For
example, the ICCPR provides that the "[flreedom to manifest one's religion
or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
296. See Religion Declaration, supra note 166, art. 6.
297. UDHR, supra note 167, art. 18 (emphasis added).
298. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 18(1)) (emphasis added).
299. See Roger S. Clark, The United Nations and Religious Freedom, 11 N.Y.U.J. Iur'L L.
& POL. 197, 204 (1978).
300. See id. at 200.
301. See Lerner, Final Text, supra note 288, at 187-88.
302. The Religion Declaration rejects even the "have or adopt" language in favor of
"have." It provides that everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion including "freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching." See Reli-
gion Declaration, supra note 166, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
303. Id. at 110 (Article 1(2)).
304. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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fundamental rights and freedoms of others."305 Likewise, the Religion
Declaration subjects religious liberty "to such limitations as are prescribed
by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."306 The same exception
applies to each of the specific forms of religious expression acknowledged
by the Religion Declaration, as well as Article l's guarantee that "[n]o one
shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a reli-
gion or belief of his choice."30 7 Article 18 of the Universal Declaration,
which extends to everyone "the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion," is also subject to a limitations clause.
308
Regimes seeking to suppress religious minorities invariably invoke
these limitations clauses by characterizing the activities of religious minori-
ties as subversive or otherwise injurious to the public good.309 For exam-
ple, to justify the fiercest crackdown yet on Sunni Muslims, Christians, and
Bahais, Iranian officials insisted in 1994 that conversions from Shiite Islam
were "subverting the revolution" and "undermining the public welfare."
310
The word "fundamental" before the phrase "human rights" in Article 1 of
the Religion Declaration and Article 18 of the ICCPR was designed to pre-
vent this type of abuse by legitimating restrictions on religious expression
only when the latter impinged on fundamental rights and freedoms.
311
Unfortunately, this construction has done little for the over 200 Bahais exe-
cuted since 1979 for "religious subversion."312 Failure to agree on what
constitutes fundamental human rights means that only extremely
305. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 18(3). Article 19 of the ICCPR adds that "[e]veryone
shall have the right to freedom of expression," except when respect for the rights or
reputations of others is hindered or national security, public order, public health, or
morals take precedence. Id. art. 19(2), (3). Article 22 similarly provides that
"[elveryone shall have the right to freedom of association with others," subject to restric-
tions "prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Id. art. 22(1),
(2).
306. Religion Declaration, supra note 166, art. 1; see also supra note 304. In approv-
ing Article 1, the Government of Panama stated that Christian morality is included, with
public order, as one of two grounds for imposing limitations on the freedom to practice
all religions, in recognition of the fact that Catholicism is the majority religion. See U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1987/37, at 13 (response from Government of Panama). Likewise, the
Government of Colombia emphasized that the constitutional provision guaranteeing the
freedom to practice any religion not contrary to Christian morality reflects the fact that
Catholicism has historically been the religion professed by the majority of Colombians.
See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/43, at 10-11 (response from Government of Colombia).
307. Religion Declaration, supra note 166, art. 1.
308. UDHR, supra note 167, art. 18. The UDHR's limitation clause states "[i]n the
exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as
are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for
the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society." Id. art. 29(2).
309. See Sullivan, supra note 171, at 499.
310. Hedges, supra note 156, at AS.
311. See Sullivan, supra note 171, at 497.
312. Hedges, supra note 156, at A5.
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unimaginative regimes can violate Article 1 of the Religion Declaration or
Article 18 of the ICCPR by suppressing religious expression.
3. Freedom from Religious Discrimination
The non-discrimination clause of the Religion Declaration appears less
malleable on first review than the free exercise clauses,3 13 because the limi-
tations clause in Article 1 of the Religion Declaration does not expressly
apply to Article 2.3 14 Article 2 seems to provide, unconditionally, that
"[n]o one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group
of persons, or person on grounds of religion or other beliefs."315 Article 2
even borrows language from the International Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 316 in order to define
"intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief" broad-
ly as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification
or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights
and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis."317 According to
commentators, this includes intentional or unintentional and public
or private acts of discrimination.3 18 Article 3 of the Religion Dec-
laration adds that religious discrimination "constitutes an affront to
human dignity and a disavowal of the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations."3 19 This reflects the strong general non-discrim-
ination norm repeated frequently in the UDHR, 320 ICCPR, 32 1 the
313. See Religion Declaration, supra note 166, art. 2.
314. See id.
315. Id.
316. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, G.A. Res. 2106A, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14 at 66 (1965), 660 U.N.T.S.
195 [hereinafter Race Convention].
317. Religion Declaration, supra note 166, art. 2; cf. Race Convention, supra note 316,
(defining race discrimination at "[any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference
based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms .. .
318. See Sullivan, supra note 171, at 502.
319. Religion Declaration, supra note 166, art. 3.
320. See supra note 167. Article 1 of the UDHR provides "[a]ll human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights"; Article 2 provides "[elveryone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social ori-
gin, property, birth or other status"; Article 7 provides "[a]ll are equal before the law and
are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law."
321. See supra note 167. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR provides that "[e]ach State Party to
the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status"; Article 3 pro-
vides "[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of
men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present
Covenant"; Article 26 provides "[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law."
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ICESC,3 22 and other major international declarations and conventions
on human rights.
323
In fact, the Religion Declaration's absolute prohibition of religious dis-
crimination ironically minimizes the enforceability of Article 2. Article 2 is
simply too overbroad to be an effective weapon against religious persecu-
tion.3 24 In contrast to other anti-discrimination declarations, 3 25 the Reli-
gion Declaration does not clearly define what acts constitute
impermissible religious discrimination.326 For example, whereas CEDAW
clearly prohibits denying women equal access to educational institu-
tions,327 denying equal access to religious minorities may not violate the
Religion Declaration (e.g., where equal access to educational institutions
would translate into a discriminatory imposition on another group or lead
to public disorder).3
28
Furthermore, although the limitation clause in Article 1 does not
expressly apply to Article 2,3 29 in practice it must apply in many situa-
tions, e.g., when non-discriminatory treatment would lead to public disor-
der or violate the public welfare. Consider the situation of a religious
minority claiming that polygamy is an essential aspect of its religious
observance. Pursuant to Article 2 of the Religion Declaration, the minority
could insist that the state may not outlaw polygamy without impermissibly
discriminating against them. The state, on the other hand, could allege the
limitation clause in Article 1 applies to polygamy because it violates public
health and morals. In this event, Article 2 of the Religious Declaration
322. See supra note 167. Article 2(2) of the ICESC provides that parties "undertake to
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status;" Article 13(1) adds
that education must be directed to "enable all persons to participate effectively in a free
society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and
all.., religious groups."
323. See, e.g., Race Convention, supra note 316; CEDAW, supra note 173; Convention
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, supra note 172;
UNESCO Convention, supra note 172.
324. The overbreadth of Article 2 could bring it into conflict with other provisions of
the Religion Declaration (e.g., Article 1), as well as the UDHR and the ICCPR. See Ler-
ner, Toward a Draft Declaration, supra note 168, at 98 (recognizing the overbreadth of the
anti-discrimination provisions in the Religion Declaration and arguing that Article 2
"should be read as meaning that a distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference
would be unlawful if it had either the purpose or the effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an
equal basis."); see also Sullivan, supra note 171, at 504.
325. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 173, arts. 7, 10-11, 16 (describing specific prohib-
ited acts).
326. See Sullivan, supra note 171, at 507.
327. See supra note 173, art. 10. Article 10 has eight sub-sections clearly defining
what the drafters meant by "unequal conditions of access to educational institutions."
Id. For example, women must be given "(b) access to the same curricula" and "(d) the
same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study grants." Id. In con-
trast, the Religion Declaration defines discrimination with less specificity. See supra
note 167, art. 2.
328. See supra note 313.
329. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
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would conflict with Article 1, as well as with the limitations clauses of the
ICCPR3 30 and the UDHR,3 3 1 and Articles 3 and 6 of CEDAW (requiring
states to prevent the exploitation of women and ensure their equal treat-
ment before the law).332 This example illustrates how the Religion Decla-
ration's non-discrimination rule is too general and far-reaching to be
effective.
B. Regional Conventions and Other Instruments
Regional human rights instruments protecting religious liberty share (in
differing degrees) the same limitations as multilateral human rights instru-
ments. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms 3 33 (the European Convention), together with its
five protocols and the Helsinki Final Act (Final Act) and subsequent inter-
pretive amendments and accords culminating in the Charter of Paris for a
New Europe (Paris Charter)33 4 is the most effective regional regime for the
protection of human rights.33 5 Other important regional human rights
agreements include the American Convention on Human Rights33 6 (the
American Convention); the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peo-
330. See supra note 304.
331. See supra note 307.
332. See supra note 173, arts. 3, 6.
333. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter
the European Convention].
334. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Helsinki
Final Act), Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975) [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act]. The
Helsinki Final Act is not strictly a regional convention. Included among its 54 current
members are two non-European countries, the United States and Canada. The key
amendments and accords interpreting and expanding upon the Final Act include, in
chronological order, the Madrid Concluding Document (passed in September 1983); the
Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting (passed in January 1989)
(Vienna Concluding Document); the Paris Charter (passed in November 1990); and the
Helsinki Document (passed in July 1992). The Paris Charter established the first per-
manent institutions for the CSCE; the Madrid Concluding Document focused on secur-
ity and economic issues with marginal gains for human rights; the Vienna Concluding
Document "contained the most comprehensive human rights commitments ever
achieved in the history of East-West negotiations;" and the Helsinki Document called for
the CSCE to be involved in conflict prevention and crisis management. See JOHN FRY,
THE HELsINIa PRocEss: NEGOTIATING SEcuaI AND COOPERTION IN EuROPE 74-75, 140
(1993).
335. See JAMES W. NICKEL, MAIUNG SENSE OF HuMAN RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL RELEC-
TIONS ON TmE UNrvERsAL DECLARATION OF HumAN RIGHTS 10 (1987); see also Rudolf Bern-
hardt, Human Rights Aspects of Racial and Religious Hatred Under Regional Human Rights
Conventions, 22 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 17, 17-18 (1993). Bernhardt explained that
[t]he European Convention was the first human rights document that provided
for an effective international mechanism for the enforcement of human
rights .... In the early 1990s, more than 1,500 individual applications were
registered annually by the European Commission of Human Rights, and more
than 30 of these cases have reached the European Court and were decided by
binding judgments.
Id.
336. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 20, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
(entered into force July 18, 1998) [hereinafter American Convention].
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ple's Rights 33 7 (the African Charter); the Cairo Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam 338 (the Cairo Declaration); and the Universal Islamic Decla-
ration of Human Rights (the Islamic Declaration).339 Each of these
regional human rights instruments will be discussed in turn.
1. European Convention on Human Rights and Helsinki Final Act
Under the European Convention, citizens of Western European nations
have the right to petition the European Commission of Human Rights (the
European Commission) individually and to pursue binding adjudication
through the European Court of Human Rights (the European Court).340
Individual petition represents "a remarkable innovation in international
law."341 Twenty-three contracting parties to the European Convention have
signed the optional individual petition procedure as of 1992.342 Under the
Convention, petitions first are referred to the European Commission for
non-binding, quasi-judicial determination. 343 The European Commission,
respondent state, or individual applicant may also refer a petition to the
European Court for binding resolution.344 The Committee of Ministers,
which consists of the government representatives of each of the members-
states of the Council of Europe, is charged with ensuring compliance with
the European Court's rulings.345
The right of individual petition is not available to Europeans under the
Final Act and Paris Charter.346 Neither is binding adjudication available to
participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) unless they agree to submit a dispute to the Court of Con-
ciliation and Arbitration. Nevertheless, the Helsinki Final Act sets forth
important humanitarian rights, which participant states in the CSCE may
seek to enforce through diplomacy.347 For example, Article 7 of the Hel-
337. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 20, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter].
338. Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Aug. 5, 1990, U.N. GAOR, World
Conf, on Human Rts., 4th Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18
(1993) [hereinafter Cairo Declaration].
339. Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, Sept. 18, 1991 [hereinafter
Islamic Declaration].
340. See ROBERTSON, supra note 94, at 87-89.
341. Id. at 87.
342. See Kevin Boyle, Europe: The Council of Europe, the CSCE, and the European Com-
munity, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 135 (Hurst Hannum ed.,
1992). See id. at 151-56. See also JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 93-97
(1993).
343. See Boyle, supra note 342, at 136-37.
344. See id. at 137.
345. See id. at 138; see also ROBERTSON, supra note 94, at 90-92.
346. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190 (1991) [herein-
after Paris Charter]. In the Paris Charter, member-states of the CSCE reaffirmed the
principles of the Helsinki Final Act.
347. Summits of CSCE members occur roughly every two years. Diplomacy occurs in
the intervening period through permanent institutions of the CSCE, the Ministerial
Council (consisting of the foreign ministers of CSCE states), and the Senior Council
(consisting of senior officials from the various European capitals and Vienna-based dele-
gations, which prepare the work of the Ministerial Council, carry out its decisions,
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sinki Final Act requires participating states to "respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, reli-
gion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or reli-
gion."3 48 It continues, "States will recognize and respect the freedom of
the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others,
religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own con-
science."3 49 Additionally, participating states must "take effective meas-
ures to prevent and eliminate discrimination against individuals or
communities on the grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exer-
cise, and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all
fields of civil, political, economic, social and cultural life, and to ensure the
effective equality between believers and non-believers."
35 0
Article 9(1) of the European Convention provides that "[elveryone has
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance."3 51 This guarantee
has helped secure religious liberty for most Europeans, including some
religious minorities. For example, Norway eliminated its former constitu-
tional ban on Jesuits to conform with the requirements of the European
Convention; Switzerland similarly amended its constitution to permit
Jesuits to open educational establishments; and Belgium granted unem-
ployment benefits to a practicing Jew who appealed the state's initial denial
review current issues and consider future work for the CSCE). See FRY, supra note 334,
at 282-83; see also The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (visited Mar.
1, 2000) <www.osce.org>; HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND TiE HEasINIau AccoRD
6 (Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1977) (although not a treaty, the Helsinki Final Act "estab-
lishes a valid basis, as between the signatory states, for seeking information and
exchanging views on the Helsinki Final Act, for making demands for compliance with its
provisions, and for monitoring such compliance."); VOJTECH MASTNY, THE HELsINKI PRO-
cEss AND THE REINTEGRATION OF EUROPE, 1986-91: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATiON 282-86
(1992) (discussing the institutions of the CSCE). The CSCE's principal institutions
include the Permanent Council, which is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the
CSCE; the Forum for Security Cooperation, which handles European security issues; the
Chairman-in-Office, which is responsible for the coordination of and consultation on
current CSCE business on behalf of the Ministerial Council and Senior Council; the
Secretary General, who is the CSCE's chief administrative officer and oversees the Secre-
tariat; the High Commissioner for National Minorities, who oversees responses to ethnic
tensions throughout Europe; the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,
which monitors compliance with the humanitarian principles of the Final Act and its
amendments and accords; and the Office for Free Elections, and the Conflict Prevention
Center. Other CSCE bodies include the Parliamentary Assembly, which meets once a
year; the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, which settles disputes which are submit-
ted to it by the CSCE states; and CSCE missions to trouble spots around Europe.
348. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 334, art. 7.
349. Id.
350. Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE Conference, art.
16(a), 28 I.L.M. 527 (1989).
351. European Convention, supra note 333, art. 9(1).
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of his unemployment benefits because he refused to appear on Saturday to
have his employment card stamped.
352
However, Article 9(1) is also subject "to such limitations as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.""3 3 Similar limitations
clauses apply to the European Convention's separate protections for free-
dom of expression 354 and freedom of assembly and association.
355
Such limitations clauses do not apply to the European Convention's
anti-discrimiiation clause, which provides that "[t]he enjoyment of the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as... religion... or other status."
3 56
In fact, the European Commission has held that when member-states
restrict freedom of expression under paragraph (2) of Articles 8 through
11 of the European Convention, they are bound by Article 14's prohibition
of discrimination.357 Consequently, member-states theoretically can jus-
tify religious discrimination only when the discrimination has an objective
aim, is consistent with the public interest, and does not exceed a reason-
able relation to its aim.
35 8
In practice, however, Article 14 has not protected unpopular European
religious minorities from discrimination. In recent years, Europe has wit-
nessed increasing animus towards religious minorities comparable to the
political hysteria surrounding McCarthyism in the United States.
35 9
France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Greece have singled-out religious
minorities for surveillance.360 France and Belgium set up parliamentary
inquiry commissions which published reports listing, respectively, 172
and 189 so-called dangerous and harmful sects.361 Jehovah Witnesses,
who are adherents to the third largest faith in France, are suffering from
"virtual administrative inquisition."362 Germany created a parliamentary
commission on sects and published a report; it also placed the Church of
Scientology under surveillance. 363 And in 1993, a confidential report
leaked to the press revealed that the Greek National Intelligence Service
352. See Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENImON
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 212 (Francis G. Jacobs & Robin C.A. White eds., 1996) [hereinafter
Freedom of Thought].
353. European Convention, supra note 333, art. 9(2).
354. See id. art. 10(2).
355. See id. art. 11(2).
356. European Convention, supra note 333, art. 14.
357. See Freedom of Thought, supra note 352, at 218; .see also Freedom from Discrimina-
tion, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 285-86 (Francis G. Jacobs &
Robin CA_ White eds., 1996) [hereinafter Freedom from Discrimination].
358. Freedom from Discrimination, supra note 357, at 286-87.
359. Religious Freedom in Western Europe: Religious Minorities and Growing Govern-
ment Intolerance: Hearing Before the Comm. on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th
Cong. 3-4, 10 (1999).
360. See id. at 3-6.
361. See id. at 4, 11.
362. Id. at 8.
363. See id. at 3.
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"had been keeping files and classifying non-Orthodox citizens according to
their respective religion, putting their activities under police surveillance,
and encouraging authorities to take repressive and preventive measures
against these 'non-genuine Greeks."' 364 The Service listed the Roman
Catholic Church and a number of Protestant churches and organizations,
including the Lutheran Church, as national enemies. 365
The European Commission and Court have not protected religious
persons from these attacks. Their record with respect to controversial reli-
gious minorities is particularly disappointing. For example, the European
Commission held that the United Kingdom did not violate Article 9(1) of
the European Convention by (1) denying or withdrawing student status for
members of the Church of Scientology, (2) refusing or terminating their
work permits and employment vouchers, and (3) refusing them extensions
of stay within the United Kingdom to continue their studies.366 The Euro-
pean Commission also found no violation of Article 9 when Sweden
restricted the language that the Church of Scientology employed to adver-
tise the Hubbard Electrometer, a device critical to the practice of
Scientology.367 The Commission has also held that member-states of the
Council of Europe may discriminate against religious persons unequally
before the law in education368 and military service.369
Likewise, the European Court has demonstrated ambivalence in
enforcing the European Convention's religious freedom guarantees. In
Kokkinakis v. Greece,370 the Court ruled unanimously that Greece violated
Article 9 when it denied Jehovah Witnesses the right to open and operate a
place of worship in Crete. However, in the same opinion, the Court failed
to condemn the Greek law permitting authorities to distinguish between
"known religions" and "unknown religions."371 As a result, Greece contin-
ues to deny licenses to disfavored religious minorities. The Kokkinakis
decision also upheld Greece's ban on proselytism, even though the ban
364. See id. at 4.
365. See id.
366. See Church of X v. United Kingdom, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 306, 318-22
(Eur. Comm'n on H..).
367. See Pastor X and the Church of Scientology v. Sweden, 1979 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on
H.. 244, 250 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
368. See Church of Xv. United Kingdom, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 306,318,322.
369. See Grandrath v. Federal Republic of Germany, 10 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.. 694
(1967), where the European Commission declared Germany did not violate the Euro-
pean Convention by treating Jehovah's Witnesses differently from Catholic priests and
Protestant ministers (who were exempt as conscientious objectors from both military
and non-military service). Germany ordered Grandrath to undertake non-military ser-
vice. The European Commission argued that Grandrath could undertake his religious
obligations during his spare time away from non-military service.
370. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.. (ser. A) (1993).
371. Id. See Titos Manoussakis and others v. Greece, Reports ofJudgments and Deci-
sions 1996-IV (September 26, 1996); see also Religious Freedom in Western Europe:
Religious Minorities and Growing Government Intolerance, Hearing Before the Commis-
sion on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Congress, 1st Session at 6, 46-47
Uune 8, 1999) <www.house.gov/csce> [hereinafter Religious Freedom].
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arguably violates the Helsinki Final Act.3 72 Using a technique that Islamic
regimes commonly employ against Christians in the 1990s, the European
Court distinguished between "proper" and "improper" proselytism, charac-
terizing the former as bearing Christian witness and the latter as "a corrup-
tion or deformation of [evangelism] which was not compatible with respect
for freedom of thought, conscience and religion."
3 73
Judge Pettiti and Judge Martens pointed out that distinguishing
between proper and improper proselytism is at best difficult and at worst
meaningless. 3 74 Judge Pettiti argued, "[tihe only limits on the exercise of
this right are those dictated by respect for the rights of others where there
is an attempt to coerce the person into consenting or to use manipulative
techniques. ,37 5 Judge Martens and Judge De Meyer expressed doubt that
even religious coercion justifies limits on such a fundamental right as free
expression.3 76 Judge De Meyer argued, "[p]roselytism, defined as 'zeal in
spreading the faith,' cannot be punishable as such... ."377 Judge Martens
contended that Article 9 of the European Convention prohibits member-
states from making it a criminal offense to attempt to induce somebody to
change his or her religion.3 7 8 He explained:
Coercion in the present context does not refer to conversion by coercion, for
people who truly believe do not change their beliefs as a result of coercion;
what we are really contemplating is coercion in order to make somebody
join a denomination and its counterpart, coercion to prevent somebody
from leaving a denomination. Even in such a case of 'coercion for religious
purposes' it is in principle for those concerned to help themselves. Accord-
ingly, if there is to be legal remedy, it should be a civil-law [sic] remedy. The
strict neutrality which the State is bound to observe in religious matters
excludes interference in this conflict by means of criminal law. Unless, of
course, the coercion, apart from its purpose, constitutes an ordinary crime,
such as physical assault.
3 79
In contrast, Judges Valticos, Foighel, and Loizou argued that Greece's crim-
inal law prohibiting the "rape of the beliefs of others cannot in any way be
regarded as contrary to Article 9 of the Convention."3 80 According to
Judge Valticos, Article 9 "certainly means freedom to practice and manifest
[religion], but not to attempt persistently to combat and alter the religion of
372. Religious Freedom, supra note 371, at 25.
373. Kokkinalds, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 21. The Court ultimately held the conviction of
the Jehovah's Witnesses was not justified under the Greek anti-proselytization statute,
not because the statute was invalid, but because the Greek action was not premised on
consideration of the manner in which the petitioners attempted to proselytize, i.e.,
whether it was proper or improper. See id.
374. See id. at 26 (Pettiti, J., concurring in part); id. at 38 (Martens, J., dissenting in
part).
375. Id. at 26.
376. See id. at 29 (De Meyer, J., concurring); id. at 37-38 (Martens, J., dissenting in
part).
377. Id. at 37-38; id. at 29 (De Meyere, J., concurring).
378. See id. at 37-38 (Martens, J., dissenting in part).
379. Id. 'at 38.
380. Id. at 31 (Valticos, J., dissenting). See also id. at 40-41 (Foighel and Loizou, JJ.,
dissenting).
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others, to influence minds by active and often unreasonable propa-
ganda."38' Under the majority's reasoning, Article 9 gives Europeans the
freedom to proselytize "properly," i.e., to share the majority religion (in this
case, Greek Orthodox Christianity). On the other hand, religious minori-
ties can be denied the right to proselytize and express themselves freely,
notwithstanding the European Court's admission that evangelism consti-
tutes an "essential mission and a responsibility" of the believer.382
These are dangerous precedents for all European religious persons,
none of whom can be sure that their religion will remain the majority one.
In the words of Justice Hugo L. Black, "Centuries of experience testify that
laws aimed at one political or religious group, however rational these laws
may be in their beginnings, generate hatreds and prejudice which rapidly
spread beyond control."
383
2. American Convention on Human Rights
The American Convention is modeled broadly after the European Conven-
tion, but has a much weaker central adjudicative and legislative mechanism
which hampers compliance with its provisions.384 The history of human
rights abuses and non-democratic governance in Latin America further
undermines the enforceability of the American Convention. 385 Although
any person, group, or non-governmental agency legally recognized by a
member of the Organization of American States (OAS) may complain to the
Inter-American Commission, member-states can choose not to cooperate
with Inter-American Commission investigations.386 In response, the Inter-
381. Id. at 30 (Valticos, J., dissenting).
382. Id. at 21 (stating that the World Council of Churches recognized in 1956 that
"true evangelism," meaning in context "bearing Christian witness," is "an essential mis-
sion and a responsibility of every Christian and every Church.").
383. American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 448 (1950)
(Black, J., dissenting).
384. See supra notes 333 and 336; see also ROBERTSON, supra note 94, at 138-39 (not-
ing that although the conventions are similar, the American Convention (but not the
European Convention) includes the right of reply, the rights of the child, the rights to a
name and to a nationality, and the right of asylum; whereas the European Convention
(but not the American Convention) provides the right to education). The American
Convention's adjudicative body is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Inter-
American Court); its legislative body is the Inter-American Commission on Hurman
Rights (the Inter-American Commission). See Dinah L. Shelton, The Inter-American
Human Rights System, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRCrICE, supra note
335. at 119-20; ANNA P. SCHREIBER, THE INTER-AmERIcAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
48-54 (1970).
385. See ROBERTSON, supra note 94, at 104, 144-45 (stating that compliance with
human rights guarantees is easier when the states and individuals involved intend to
respect the rules, but much more difficult when, as in Latin America, a lack of consen-
sus exists about the legitimacy of the rules; also contrasting the allegedly "lesser" human
rights concerns the European Commission typically confronts with the serious abuses
of human rights that the Inter-American Commission confronts); accord DONNELLY,
supra note 342, at 86.
386. See Shelton, supra note 384, at 122-23, 131. Acceptance of the right of individ-
ual petition follows automatically from ratification of the American Convention,
whereas the procedure for inter-State complaints is optional under the American Con-
vention. See ROBERTSON, supra note 94, at 129.
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American Commission is empowered merely to publish a critical report,
recommend policy changes, or, in some instances, refer the case to the
Inter-American Court.
3 87
The Inter-American Court possesses jurisdiction over a case only if (1)
the state concerned is a party to both the American Convention and the
optional jurisdictional protocol; (2) the Commission or state decides to
refer the case; and (3) proceedings before the Inter-American Commission
are concluded.388 As of 1992, only thirteen of the thirty-five member-
states of the OAS agreed to binding Inter-American Court jurisdiction.
38 9
Furthermore, as of 1993, the Inter-American Court had heard only two
contentious cases: one dealing with a "disappearance" in Honduras and
the other with a military attack on two journalists in Peru. 390 Since 1993,
the number of contentious cases the Inter-American Court has reviewed
has risen to eleven.391 Hence, although conditions are improving for a
more active Inter-American Court, the Inter-American Commission
remains the key proponent of human rights and, thus, religious liberty
under the American Convention.
Article 12(1) of the American Convention provides that "[e]veryone
has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion," including "freedom
to maintain or to change one's religion or beliefs, and freedom to profess or
disseminate one's religion or beliefs either individually or together with
others, in public or in private."392 Hence, Article 12(1), unlike the Euro-
pean Convention and U.N. human rights instruments, expressly protects
proselytism, subject to Article 12(3), the limitations clause. Article 12(3)
subjects freedom of conscience and religion under Article 12(1) "only to
the limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the rights or freedoms of others."
393
Like the European Convention, the American Convention also provides
separate guarantees for freedom of expression and freedom of assembly
and association, subject to limitations clauses.394 Also, the American Con-
vention does not expressly limit the right to equal protection under the
387. See Shelton, supra note 384, at 128-29; see also SCHR I ER, supra note 384, at 48,
53. For a brief review of the Inter-American Commission's effectiveness through the
early-1970s, see SCHR'IBER, supra note 384, at 157-60. The Inter-American Court held its
first meeting in 1979. See Nicm_, supra note 334, at 12.
388. See Shelton, supra note 384, at 129.
389. See id. at 131.
390. See DoNNELLY, supra note 342, at 85.
391. See Contentious Cases of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (visited Mar. 1,
2000) <http://www.1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/conmtus.htn.
392. American Convention, supra note 336, art. 12(1). Cf. American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of Ameri-
can States, O.A.S. Res. xxx, Mar. 30 - May 2, 1948, art. 3, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ ser. L/
V./I.4 rev.6 (1965) ("Every person has the right freely to profess a religious faith, and to
manifest and practice it both in public and in private.").
393. American Convention, supra note 336, art. 12(3). Cf. Article 28 of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 392, arts. 13, 15-16 ("The rights
of a man are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just
demands of the general welfare and the advancement of democracy.").
394. See American Convention, supra note 336, arts. 13, 15-16.
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law.3 95 The American Convention's principal weakness is that its pur-
ported religious liberties remain essentially untested. Nevertheless, the
American Convention potentially protects religious liberty more fully than
the European Convention or U.N. human rights instruments.
3. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
The African Charter's religious liberty provisions are much weaker than
those of the American Convention. The Organization of the African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Commission) is the
legislative body in charge of implementing the African Charter. Unfortu-
nately, the African Commission has found numerous obstacles in attempt-
ing to implement the Charter's human rights protections. 39 6 The
developmental challenges and human rights abuses in Africa are among
the most severe in the world. Although any member-state of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU) may charge another with violations of the
terms of the African Charter, as of October 1991, none had done so.
39 7
Individuals have no right to petition the African Commission unless a
majority of the OAU approves a petition. Furthermore, reflecting the over-
all political aversion to exposing themselves to binding judgments in the
field of human rights, African countries did not provide for the establish-
ment of an African court on human rights in the African Charter.
398
In addition, the limitations clauses in the African Charter apply more
broadly than in any other human rights document.3 99 Article 8 of the Afri-
can Charter provides that "[flreedom of conscience, the profession and free
practice of religion shall be guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and
order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these free-
doms."'4 0 Accordingly, the African Charter may be interpreted to permit
greater derogation from freedom of thought and belief than other regional
human rights instruments, which place narrower limitations on such free-
doms.40 1 Limitations clauses also appear in Article 9 ("Every individual
shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the
law"); Article 10 ("Every individual shall have the right to free association
provided that he abides by the law"); and Article 11 ("Every individual shall
395. See id. art. 24; cf. European Convention, supra note 333, art. 14. See also Article
3 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention in the Area of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Nov. 14, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 156 (1989) (dealing
with the obligation of nondiscrimination).
396. See Cees Flinterman & Evelyn Ankumah, The African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs PcncE, supra note 342, at
167-68; see also DONNELLY, supra note 342, at 90-92.
397. See Flinterman & Ankumah, supra note 396, at 162, 167.
398. See id. at 162. See also W. Scott Thompson & 1. William Zartman, The Develop-
ment of Norms in the African System, in THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRIcAN UNrY AFrE TEN
YEARs: COMPARATIvE PERSPEC VES 24-31 (Yassin EI-Ayouty ed., 1975) (concerning the
norm of non-intervention in Africa).
399. See Flinterman & Ankumah, supra note 396, at 166.
400. African Charter, supra note 337, art. 8.
401. Cf. American Convention, supra note 336, art. 12(3); European Convention,
supra note 333, arts. 9(2), 10(2), 11(2).
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have the right to assemble freely with others,... subject only to necessary
restrictions provided for by law in particular those enacted in the interest of
national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of
others.") 40 2 Only the African Charter's non-discrimination provisions con-
tain language which could be interpreted meaningfully to protect religious
minorities. 4°3 Specifically, Article 3(2) provides that "[e]very individual
shall be entitled to equal protection of the law."
404
In addition, Article 60 of the African Charter directs the African Com-
mission to "draw inspiration from international law on human and peo-
ples' rights," and Article 61 directs it to "take into consideration, as
subsidiary measures to determine the principles of law, other general or
special international conventions ... "4o5 Thus, jurists seeking to construe
the African Charter broadly contend that the African Charter does not
"diminish human rights obligations that states have accepted pursuant to
other international conventions," e.g., the ICCPR, the UDHR, and the Reli-
gious Declaration. 40 6 Unfortunately, the OAU has more often focused on
the limitations of the African Charter than its potential. 40 7
4. Middle East Documents on Human Rights
The Islamic countries of the Middle East have never adopted any binding
regional human rights instruments, and the existing non-binding agree-
ments are of little significance for religious minorities. The Arab League's
Permanent Arab Regional Commission on Human Rights, formed in 1968,
was the Middle East's first foray into regional human rights enforcement.
Apart from publicizing certain human rights violations in Israeli-occupied
territory, the Commission has been largely dormant.408 Few Arab attor-
neys even know that the Commission persists. 40 9
The non-binding Cairo Declaration, adopted by the Organization of
the Islamic Conference in 1990, is more visible.410 Only Saudi Arabia and
Iran strongly endorse it, however.41' Article 10 of the Cairo Declaration
provides, "Islam is the religion of unspoiled nature. It is prohibited to exer-
cise any form of compulsion on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance
402. African Charter, supra note 337, arts. 9, 10, 11 (emphasis added).
403. See id. arts. 2, 3, 19.
404. Id. art. 3(2). Cf. Article 2 ("Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of
the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without dis-
tinction of... religion... or other status."); Article 19 ("All peoples shall be equal; they
shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the
domination of a people by another.").
405. Id. arts. 60, 61.
406. Flinterman & Ankumah, supra note 396, at 166-67.
407. See DONNELLY, supra note 342, at 92.
408. See Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14
WIs. INT'L .J. 349, 395 (1996); see also DONNELLY, supra note 342, at 92 (the Permanent
Arab Commission on Human Rights "has been notably inactive, except for occassional
efforts to publicize human rights violations in Israeli-occupied territory."
409. See Arzt, supra note 408, at 395.
410. See supra note 338.
411. See Artz, supra note 408, at 361.
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in order to convert him to another religion or to atheism."412 Although this
suggests, on its face, that coercion in pursuit of religious conversion is pro-
hibited, Article 10 must be viewed in the context of another provision in
the Cairo Declaration providing that it is based solely on the Shari'a.413
When viewed in this light, Article 10 prevents the use of compulsion or
exploitation to convert someone from Islam to another religion or atheism,
not vice-versa.41
4
Other Cairo Declaration provisions that also appear to operate unilat-
erally in favor of Muslims include Article 22(b) ("[e]veryone shall have the
right to advocate what is right, and propagate what is good, and warn
against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic
Shari'a")415 and Article 22(a) ("[elveryone shall have the right to express
his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary to the princi-
ples of the Shari'a.")416 The Cairo Declaration does not expressly refer-
ence the rights of non-Muslims and noticeably fails to provide for "freedom
of thought, conscience and religion," unlike the U.N. international human
rights instruments. 41 7
The Islamic Declaration 418 offers little more protection for religious
minorities; it prohibits as much as it promises. On the one hand, Article
13 of the Islamic Declaration guarantees that "[e]very person shall have the
right to freedom of conscience and worship in accordance with one's reli-
gious beliefs";419 and Article 12(e) provides that "[n]o one shall hold in
contempt or ridicule the religious beliefs of others or incite public hostility
against them."420 Article 10 (Rights of Minorities) adds, "[t]he Qur'anic
principle 'There is no compulsion in religion' shall govern the religious
rights of non-Muslim minorities."421 Article 10 further provides that "[i]n
a Muslim country, religious minorities shall have the choice to be governed
in respect of their civil and personal matters by Islamic Law or by their
own laws."
'422
On the other hand, Article 12(a) provides that every person may
express his thoughts and beliefs "so long as he remains within the limits
prescribed by the Law [Shari'a]," 42 3 and that "[n]o one ... is entitled to
disseminate falsehood or to circulate reports which may outrage public
decency, or to indulge in slander, innuendo or to cast defamatory asper-
sions on other persons."424 Accordingly, the Islamic Declaration can be
412. Cairo Declaration, supra note 338, art. 10.
413. See Arzt, supra note 408, at 361.
414. See id.
415. Cairo Declaration, supra note 338, art. 22(b).
416. Id. art. 22(a).
417. See Arzt, supra note 408, at 361.
418, Islamic Declaration, supra note 339.
419. Id. art. 13.
420. Id. art. 12(e).
421. Id. art. 10.
422. Id.
423. Id. art. 12(a).
424. Id. See also ANN EuzABEri MAYER, Isl.~m AND HuMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND
Pouncs 87-88 (1991).
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interpreted less as a guarantee of religious liberty than a ground for
criminalizing religious expression.
425
V. Challenge for the Future
The challenge for the future is for the members of the U.N. Security Coun-
cil to develop effective policies both domestically and internationally that
will ensure at least basic liberties for religious minorities. The first priority
should be relatively non-controversial. The Security Council must enforce
jus cogens against genocide, slavery, and torture. This step alone would
eliminate some of the worst violations of human rights that religious
minorities suffer. In the process, the Security Council would revitalize
international law by encouraging respect for its most basic guarantees.
Enforcement would require military intervention only as a last resort
and, then, only in keeping with just war principles of utility, proportional-
ity, noncombatant immunity, and military necessity.4 26 In other words,
intervention would hinge upon just cause, use of violence as the last resort,
limited objectives, probability of success, and just use of force. 427 Short of
humanitarian intervention, the Security Council can freeze assets and cur-
tail economic, military, technical, and development assistance, credit,
trade, foreign investment, insurance, and licenses. When coordinated,
such non-military actions can have devastating effect. In the United States,
the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 provides a good first step
toward this objective. 428 Although it may be overly optimistic to hope for
coordinated sanctions with respect to China, the Sudan and other killing
fields in the Third World should be relatively easy targets for cooperative
sanctions.
The model for engaging China and perhaps the rest of the Asian
Tigers, as well as strategically important Middle Eastern countries, ought
to be constructive linkage, such as the United States practiced in relation to
the Soviet Union in the late-1980s. 429 The Clinton Administration's "pol-
425. One commentator speculates that it was because of the Islamic Declaration's
limitation clauses that the Islamic Council refused to sanction the Ayatollah Khomenei
for ordering the execution of author Salmon Rushdie in a 1989 fatwa. See Arzt, supra
note 408, at 362.
426. See MICHAEL WALzER, JUST AND UNJUST WARs 129-33, 138-47 (1977).
427. See MARK R. AmSTtZ, CHwsTAN Emics & U.S. FOREGN PoLICY 93 (1987).
428. See Pub. L. No. 105-292, 2.2 U.S.C.A. § 6401-6481. The Act establishes report-
ing requirements on religious persecution, establishes an Ambassador at Large on inter-
national religious freedom, and requires the President to choose from a menu of
penalties to sanction countries violating religious freedom, unless he certifies that the
United States has a national interest in waiving the penalty. Unfortunately, in the latest
budget President Clinton submitted to the United States Congress, he did not provide
funding for the International Religious Freedom Act, which he signed into law on Octo-
ber 27, 1998.
429. "Constructive engagement" primarily involves delinking foreign policy objectives
in the area of human rights from other areas, most notably trade (including Most
Favored Nation (MFN) status and entry into the World Trade Organization) and secur-
ity. See Susumu Awanohara, Full Circle: In Renewing China's Trading Privileges, U.S.
President Clinton Seems to Have Opted for the Logic of "Constructive Engagement" on a
Broad Range of Global and Security Issues, 157 FAR EAsTmu ECONOMIC RmEw 14-15
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icy of constructive engagement with China has not produced any substan-
tial results in the human rights field."430 Since 1994, when the Clinton
Administration de-coupled Most Favored Nation status from human rights
practices, "there has been a significant regression rather than progress[ion]
on every human rights question."431 In China we can count more political
prisoners and more summary executions, and there is evidence of "a more
brutal regime in Tibet, [and] tighter controls on political and religious
expression .... -432 In fact, the U.S. State Department reported in 1996
that "all public dissent against the party and the government was effec-
tively silenced by intimidation, exile, the imposition of prison terms,
administrative detention, or house arrest. No dissidents were known to be
active at the year's end."
43 3
In contrast, realization of the human rights objectives the United
States sought to achieve in the Soviet Union depended on linkage (or at
least perceived linkage) to objectives Moscow coveted, whether arms con-
trol, trade, or a state visit.43 4 Containment was also key. The Reagan
Administration learned, much to its own surprise, that U.S. and Soviet
objectives were often complementary. 435 So far the Clinton Administration
has not explained why the same policies are not essential to achieve pro-
gress in human rights in China and other foreign policy objectives in the
Far East. Meanwhile, Washington's courtship of China has alarmed long-
time allies in East and South Asia, including Japan, Taiwan, and India,
which alone are capable of counterbalancing China.436 In contrast to these
countries, as a communist nation China will never be a dependable ally for
a liberal democracy:
It is high time for all starry-eyed dreamers to realize that the nature of com-
munism is one and the same the whole world over, that it is everywhere
inimical to the national welfare, invariably striving to destroy the national
organism in which it is developing, before moving on to destroy adjacent
organisms. No matter what the illusions of detente, no one will ever achieve
a stable peace with communism, which is capable only of voracious expan-
sion. Whatever the latest act in the charade of detente, communism contin-
(1994); Constructive Engagement, supra note 127. As was true during the period of
detente with the Soviet Union, constructive engagement also includes increased military,
economic, social, and cultural exchanges, official visits, and cooperation in a host of
economic and political undertakings. See Robert A. Manning, Clinton and China:
Beyond Human Rights, 38 ORts 193, 197 (Spring 1994); Madeleine K. Albright, The
Testing of American Foreign Policy, 77 FoI-oGN At'. 50, 57-58 (1998).
430. Constructive Engagement, supra note 127, at 86 (statement of T. Kumar, Advo-
cacy Direction for Asia & Pacific, Amnesty International USA).
431. Id. at 2 (statement of Christopher H. Smith, Representative).
432. Id.
433. Id. at 86 (statement of T. Kumar, Advocacy Direction for Asia & Pacific,
Amnesty International USA).
434. See Robert B. Cullen, Soviet Jewry, 65 FORIGN Art. 252, 259, 262 (1986/87); see
also Tamar Jacoby, The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights, 64 FOREIGN Ai=. 1066,
1083-85 (1986).
435. See Jacoby, supra note 434, at 1085-86.
436. See Ted G. Carpenter, Roiling Asia: U.S. Coziness with China Upsets the Neighbors,
77 FORMGN AFF. 2, 5-6 (1998).
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ues to wage an incessant ideological war in which the West is unfailingly
referred to as the enemy. Communism will never desist from its efforts to
seize the world, be it through direct military conquest, through subversion
and terrorism, or by subtly undermining society from within.
43 7
Accordingly, the United States should buttress its long-time allies in the Far
East to counter-balance and contain China, rather than complicate their
security and force India and others into a nuclear arms race.
4 38
To address oppression of religious minorities that falls short of violat-
ing jus cogens, the Security Council also should begin to develop an inter-
national normative consensus favoring a limited list of key religious
liberties. 43 9 This Article suggests that freedom to choose and change one's
religion is a basic right of both freedom of belief and freedom of expres-
sion.4 40 A new international convention guaranteeing this right without
derogation is essential to advance religious liberty. Other important, but
secondary religious liberties, including freedom of religious speech (e.g.,
proselytizing speech), assembly, and education, 44 1 may be advanced over a
longer period, subject to a compelling interest exception.
The compelling interest test is admittedly American in origin. To be
"compelling" within the meaning of this test, "[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion."44 2 Similarly, "only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion."44 3 "Important" interests or "reasonable means of promoting a
legitimate public interest" do not qualify. 444 Furthermore, a government
cannot properly consider its policy compelling when (1) it fails to pursue
that policy uniformly with respect to all, or very nearly all, analogous situa-
tions of non-religious private conduct; or (2) the policy does not constitute
"the least restrictive means" of achieving the compelling interest. 44 5 This
type of interest is much more substantial than those currently justifying
departures. from religious liberties guaranteed in international covenants.
As set forth above, limitations clauses in U.N. covenants commonly
provide that free religious expression may be subject to such limitations as
437. Solzhenitsyn, supra note 268, at 820.
438. See generally Carpenter, supra note 436.
439. Modesty of objective generally makes compliance more likely. See Amsrturz,
supra note 427, at 119.
440. See supra Part IV.A.1-2.
441. See supra Parts II.B.2 and IV.A.1-2.
442. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
443. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
444. Douglas Laycock, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEx. L.
Ray. 209, 225 (1994) (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136,
141 (1987).
445. See Laycock, supra note 444, at 232 (citations omitted); see also Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historial Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103
HAuv. L. REv. 1410, 1416 (1990); Michael S. Paulsen, RFRA Runs Through It: Religious
Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MoNT. L. REa. 249, 251-53 (1995).
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are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
446
The limitations clauses in certain regional human rights instruments, such
as the African Charter, the Cairo Declaration, and the Islamic Declaration,
are even broader.447 Regimes seeking to suppress religious minorities inva-
riably invoke these provisions by characterizing religious minorities as
threats to national security and moral miscreants, as well as by pointing to
internal, generally applicable laws compelling limitations on religious lib-
erty. Ironically, neutral, generally applicable laws like the Shari'a not
expressly intended to discriminate against religious minorities, but none-
theless imposing serious repercussions (including death) on them, would
now be upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court following its decision in Employ-
ment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith.44 8
In contrast, a compelling interesf test presumptively excludes justifica-
tions for violations of religious liberty on grounds of subversion, order,
immorality, or disrespect for religion or a religious figure, while permitting
the state to demonstrate compelling reasons for departing from this rule to
address internationally recognized problems like terrorism, sectarian vio-
lence, and female genital mutilation. An international compelling interest
test could provide, for example, "Every individual shall have the
unrestricted right to freedom of religious speech, assembly and education
alone or in community with others and in public or private, subject only to
a compelling governmental interest recognized as legitimate under interna-
tional law." In keeping with the ordinary compelling interest rule, any pro-
posed limitation on religious liberty would have to meet two tests: the
liberty limited would have to be uniformly limited with respect to all, or
very nearly all, persons, regardless of faith, and the limitation would have
to constitute "the least restrictive means" of achieving the interest.449
Then, and only then, can the international community ensure that a
regime's purported interest in preserving national security, order, health or
some other value is not a mere subterfuge for oppressing religious
minorities.
446. See supra Part IV.A.2.
447. See supra Part IV.B.3-4.
448. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Many scholars of the First Amendment religion clauses
agree that prior to the Smith decision, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the compelling
interest test to determine when the state could burden the religious expression of indi-
viduals. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 444, at 217-18 and n.15. After Smith, the Court
asks in most instances whether a law burdening religious expression is neutral and gen-
erally applicable to determine whether it is constitutional. 494 U.S. at 878-79. Coun-
tries such as those within the "de facto/limited expression" and "both/limited
expressions" cells of Appendices 1 and 2 routinely pass laws (e.g., based on Shari'a) not
expressly intended to limit religious expression, but with the effect of outlawing or seri-
ously interfering with minority religious expression.
449. See supra note 439 and accompanying text.
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Conclusion
Depending on how freely states permit individuals to practice their reli-
gion, religion can be a powerful tool for either liberation or subjugation.
As John Locke put it, "It is not the diversity of opinions [or religions]
(which cannot be avoided), but the refusal of toleration to those that are of
different opinions ... that has produced all the bustles and wars that have
been in the Christian world upon account of religion."450 The same could
be said of regions dominated by Islamic, Hindu, Confucian, and Marxist
beliefs: wherever religious and ideological intolerance flourishes, it is asso-
ciated with egregious violations of jus cogens under international law and
other human rights abuses.
This Article has hypothesized that religious liberty and the provision
of fundamental human rights are ultimately inseparable. Cross-national
research strongly supported this hypothesis and demonstrated that estab-
lishments of religion and the type of religion practiced have, at best, secon-
dary linkages with human rights practices. International legal instruments
also suggested that the international community will never ensure free
association without permitting religious minorities to meet, free speech
without allowing religious speech, nondiscrimination and due process
without granting religious minorities equal substantive and procedural
rights under the law, democracy without allowing religious minorities to
vote and run for office, indigenous rights without protecting indigenous
religions, the rights of parents and children without protecting their right
to sectarian education, and women's rights without ensuring their freedom
to follow or reject religious teachings and customs.
As religion reasserts itself as the central organizing principle for inter-
national politics in the next century, extending religious liberty will also be
critical for geo-strategic reasons. Promoting international religious liberty
would, among other things, eliminate a potential justification for external
intervention on behalf of co-religionists, moderate fundamentalist and
nationalist movements by removing some of the impetus to their organiza-
tion and terror, and stem secessionist movements based on religious differ-
ences. Once more, religious liberty would ensure the continued viability of
the international rule of law itself, undermine religious absolutism and
ensure continued normative progress, and, finally, enable individuals to
choose a fundamental orientation toward the world. In the final analysis,
an international order enabling individuals to choose their religious con-
victions based on persuasion rather than compulsion is the only one likely
to prevent geo-religious exploitation and preserve fundamental human
rights.
450. JOHN LociE, A LEr1mR CONCERNING TOLERATION 105 (Mario Montuori trans. &
ed., 1963).
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Appendix 1: Typology of State-Religion Relationships, 1991
Establishment Limited Expression Free Expression
None Tanzania (41), Nigeria (49), Togo Netherlands (98) (p), Australia
(48), Kenya (46) (d), Zaire (40) (91) (p), Austria (95) (c), Belgium
(96) (c), Canada (94) (p), Den-
mark (98) (p), France (94) (c),
Germany (98) (p), Switzerland
(96) (p), Japan (82) (s), Botswana
(79), Hungary (97) (c), Ivory
Coast (75), Jamaica (72) (p), New
Zealand (98) (p), Trinidad (84),
South Korea (59) (d), Malawi (33)
(d), Sierra Leone (67) (d), Uganda
(46) (d), Zambia (57) (d), Angola
(27) (d), Ghana (53) (d), Came-
roon (56) (d), Mozambique (53)
(d), Rwanda (48) (d), Zimbabwe
(65) (d); Czech Republic (97) (c)
De Jure Israel (76) (j), Bulgaria (83) (o) United Kingdom (93) (p), Finland
(99) (p), Greece (87) (o), Norway
(97) (p), Sweden (98) (p)
De Facto Sudan (18) (i), India (54) (h), USA (90) (p); Ireland (94) (c);
Indonesia (34) (i), Guatemala (62) South Africa (50) (p); Mexico (64)
(c), Singapore (60) (b), Syria (30) (c), Nicaragua (75) (c), Peru (54)
(i), Thailand (62) (b), Turkey (44) (c), Philippines (72) (c), Portugal
(i) (92) (c), Spain (87) (c), Uruguay
(90) (c), Venezuela (75) (c), Argen-
tina (84) (c), Brazil (69) (c), Chile
(80) (c), Dominican Rep. (78) (c),
Ecuador (83) (c), Italy (90) (c), El
Salvador (53) (c), Honduras (65)
(c), Columbia (60) (c), Panama
(81) (c), Senegal (71) (i), Poland
(83) (c), Romania (82) (o), Guinea
(70) (i)
Both Iran (22) (i), Saudi Arabia (29) (i), Bolivia (71) (c), Costa Rica (90)
Iraq (17) (i), Nepal (69) (h), Libya (c)
(24) (i), Tunisia (60) (i), Kuwait
(33) (i), Oman (49) (i), Bangla-
desh (59) (i), Cambodia (33) (b),
Burma (17) (b), Afghanistan (28)
(i), Algeria (66) (i), Cambodia (33)
(b), Egypt (50) (i), Jordan (65) (i),
Morocco (56) (i), Pakistan (42) (i);
Tunisia (60) (i); Sri Lanka (47)
(b), Yemen (49) (i), China (21),
Cuba (30) (c), N. Korea (20), Viet-
nam (27) (b)
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Appendix 2: Typology of State-Religion Relationships, 1983
Establishment Limited Expression Free Expression
None Tanzania (62), Nigeria (64), Kenya Netherlands (94) (p), Australia
(58) (d), Zaire (41) (93) (p), Austria (92) (c), Belgium
(92) (c), Canada (94) (e), Den-
mark (96) (p), France (88) (c), W.
Germany (91) (e), Switzerland
(92) (p), Japan (92) (s), New Zea-
land (96) (p), South Korea (51)
(d), Zambia (58) (d), Mozambique
(38) (d), Zimbabwe (68) (d)
De Jure Israel (73) 0) United Kingdom (95) (p), Finland
(96) (p), Greece (80) (o), Norway
(95) (p), Sweden (94) (p)
De Facto Sudan (55) (i), India (70) (h), USA (92) (p); Ireland (86) (c);
Indonesia (53) (i), Singapore (61) South Africa (30) (p); Mexico (67)
(b), Syria (34) (i), Thailand (64) (c), Peru (81) (c), Philippines (52)
(b), Turkey (43) (i) (c), Portugal (87) (c), Spain (78)
(c), Venezuela (89) (c), Argentina
(44) (c), Brazil (70) (c), Chile (37)
(c), Ecuador (85) (c), Italy (88)
(c), Columbia (62) (c), Panama
(84) (c), Senegal (89) (i), Guinea
(93) (i)
Both Saudi Arabia (29) (i), Iraq (27) (i),
Bangladesh (64) (i), Algeria (62)
(i), Egypt (64) (i), Morocco (57)
(i), Pakistan (42) (i); Tunisia (62)
(i); Sri Lanka (75) (b), China (32),
Cuba (30) (c), N. Korea (22), Viet-
nam (29), Czechoslovakia (36) (c);
E. Germany (35); Hungary (54)
(c); Poland (36) (c), Romania (32)
(o); USSR (27) (o), Yugoslavia
(55), Bulgaria (37) (o)
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